The values of the Yemeni revolutions, their goals and their depressions

         It is challenging to discuss the values of the two revolutions in Yemen, which, in their ambitious vision before encountering setbacks, offered the people a way out of a constrained position in the north and a challenging colonial experience in the south. From a purely historical perspective, or a historical From a political standpoint, it is challenging to determine the absolute truth, as most facts are still open to interpretation. While some truths may be evident, it is possible that they represent only half of the story, with the other half remaining unknown.  It can be confirmed, however, that the revolution carried values of high human reach in its ambition, which were the foundation for a future of equal citizenship, prosperity and unbroken justice.

  However, it encountered significant challenges and underwent some difficult periods as a result of the setbacks experienced by the two revolutions. It is worth noting that these values have been affected in various ways by local, regional and international actors. Despite these challenges and the resulting violent events that have affected the country in many ways, millions of people in the north and south have continued to carry these values and aspire to them. 

        It may be superfluous to state that the principles and values espoused by the revolutions of the 26th of September and the 14th of October are deeply entrenched in the consciences and minds of millions of Yemenis. It would be challenging to eradicate, annihilate, employ and provide, without a guiding set of values, constants and goals, in the face of the various challenges Yemen is currently facing. These values can be compared to precious metals, which undergo a refining process to increase their purity, lustre and hardness. 

         It is clear that these noble values, principles, and goals have played an essential role in safeguarding this nation against various challenges, including epidemics, diseases, and other forms of adversity. We have had the privilege of witnessing and living through years of history, which have made it evident that this nation has a rich heritage and a vital role to play in its own salvation. We must acknowledge the unfortunate reality that some have turned away from these principles and goals, their promises, and their contents. We must also recognize the lack of awareness of their value and the seriousness of the civilizational gaps they have created. We must appreciate the importance of the bridges they built and worshipped in order to secure our individual and collective existence.

        Despite this, the two revolutions encountered numerous challenges, as well as numerous attempts to reinvigorate them and ensure a peaceful transition of power. However, with every significant step taken, the Yemeni leaders who initiated them faced a range of difficulties, including assassination, execution, imprisonment, and other forms of persecution. 

        In this context, this article will review many of the sharp turns of the two revolutions, and the problems that have resulted from these turns up to the present moment. It will do so in a way that goes beyond a mere review, which risks directing the analysis to the points of imbalance and attempting to dissect this imbalance as much as possible. Instead, it will seek to: It would be beneficial to clarify the vision and to gain a deeper understanding of the historical contexts of the two revolutions. By doing so, we can gain insight into the reality of the past setbacks and the current reality, which may not fully align with the values espoused by the revolutions. It is important to recognize that these values continue to survive in the hearts and minds of millions. 

        It is unfortunate that the revolutions of September and October have had to contend with a multitude of challenges over the past six decades. These challenges have included the unfortunate events that took place between two factions of the Republican regime on 23 and 24 August 1968. After seven months of success for the Republican forces, The Royal forces imposed a seventy-day siege on the capital, Sana'a, where a group of prominent military leaders were subsequently exiled. Following these events, Lt. Col. Abdul-Sergeant Abdel-Wahab, commander of the Sa'qa forces and chief of the General Staff, was liquidated after returning from exile in Algeria in early 1969. In 1969, these events had the potential to have dangerous regional implications. They also represented a significant departure from the promises of the revolution and its contents. Conservative traditional forces, with the support of Saudi Arabia, assumed control of the Republican system, despite the filtering of many symbols of modernisation. The negative effects of these changes on the state and society have been felt for decades. 

        The August coup was followed by the assassination of President Ibrahim al-Hamdi and his modernisation project on the evening of 11 October 1977, accompanied by his brother Abdullah al-Hamdi. It is believed that a number of local, regional and international actors participated in this event, and that a few months later On 26 June 1978, President Salim Rabi Ali (Salmeen) carried out a planned execution in Aden. He was accused of involvement in the assassination of Ahmed al-Ghashmi, president of North Yemen, who was accused of leading the assassination of al-Hamdi. 

        The ongoing political conflict in Yemen has undoubtedly taken a toll on the country's energy and opportunities. It is crucial to consider the long-term implications of this conflict and explore ways to address its underlying causes.  The Yemeni revolutions and their renaissance paths, from the events of 13 January 1986 in Aden and the southern part of Yemen, and the wars in the central areas, between the factions belonging to the "National Democratic Front", formed in 1976, which provided an umbrella for the "Progressive", "People's Army" and the "Organization of The Revolutionary Resistance, which was headquartered in Aden city, the capital of the socialist part of Yemen, saw members of the Nasserist organisation march on the path of unity with the National Democratic Front. 

         This Front was leading the activity of the various leftist and nationalist forces in the country, against the northern regime, which focused its armed operations on the areas between Damt, Bayda, H In addition, there were areas in the Wadi Banna region, parts of southern Taiz governorate, and the Atma, Raymah and Sabeen areas, which had been controlled by the military. On 23 February 1979, the South Yemen forces launched a significant military operation with the goal of establishing a democratic national authority in the northern part of the country. The path to achieving democratic Yemeni unity is one that has been supported by the socialist regime in Aden, the Soviet Union, and the Yemeni version of jihad against Soviet socialism under the auspices of the Saudi umbrella, which is allied with the United States of America. 

        This is also the case in the first stages of the Saleh regime's alliance with the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, where the Islamic Front A new entity was formed, which engaged in the wars of the central regions (1976-1982). This saw the emergence of a Yemeni version of the jihad, which developed in the context of the alliance between the Saleh regime and the Brotherhood on the northern part of Yemen. It reached the lines of contact in the centre of Yeme، driven by the need for general education. 

        The parties opposed to the September and October revolutions in Yemen have pushed to new levels, by reversing the commitments of the "Covenant and Agreement" signed by the partners of the government and other political forces, and even the unity agreement and the constitution of the state, legislation and laws, which deepened the imbalances and cracks, and sparked the summer war of 1994, which began as armed clashes. among several brigades, in Omran and Dhamar, on April 27, 1994, and then spread successively to a wide swath of Yemen, where, under the title of preserving unity, Saleh led a broad coalition of regular armed formations, reform Party and tribal groups, and jihadist groups returning from Afghanistan, in addition, southern formations of the faction who fled to the north following the events of January, in the face of formations led by Vice President Ali Salem al-Bayadh, under the title of disengagement and restoration of the southern state, which ended with the invasion of the southern provinces by Saleh and his coalition on July 7, 1994. 

        Despite the cessation of military operations, with the defeat of the Socialist Party forces in the south, Saleh and his victorious allies continued to invade state institutions and property.  The prevailing language of the Sajaf was not accurate, a Saleh regime can be seen from the perspective of being representative of the state, and therefore if it represents the state – regardless of the exclusion and what it practiced – its exercise is its system and its team of tasks in state institutions means that it was in a natural context, and its act was not a conquest. including corruption on land and real estate, in addition to large-scale demobilization operations, which affected the cadres of the military, security and civil institutions in the south, affiliated with the party, where this war and the subsequent demobilization and displacement work reached the level of liquidation, have had a significant impact on the politics, economy and society in Yemen. 

       Saleh’s regime has repeatedly rejected calls to address the effects of that war, and left its files open, worsening, widening and deepening its circle, and growing more complex. instead of taking the responsible initiative to address the many effects of that war, the coalition of the victorious parties and the power centers of the ruling wings are participating in the chaos of the race to harvest the spoils, bills and entitlements of that war on the remaining legacy of the defeated party, with Saleh's tendency, year after year, to kick the allies of war and government in an effort to monopolize power. through the processes of emptying the bearers of the Republic, democracy, political pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, the principles of the state constitution, laws and legislation, of their renaissance and libertarian content, in order to consolidate the authority of the individual and undermine the rights of equal citizenship as a source of power, legitimacy and legitimacy, and through six rounds of wars in the north between the forces of the Saleh government, on the one hand, the Houthi group, on the other hand, which broke out its first round on June 19, 2004, on a small scale, in a small remote village north of Saada governorate, then the war spread over six bloody rounds, characterized by randomness, manipulation, recruitment, mismanagement and illegality.

        With the horrific violations of that war, it was one of the stations that exposed the disappointing situation of the Yemeni armed forces, and the state of the state institutions as a whole, in addition, the wars of Saada, one of the largest stations of indiscriminate recruitment of tribal people, and widely interpreted that war, and its repeated failures. as an engineered trap to exhaust the forces of the Northwest region and the first armored Division under the command of major General Ali Mohsen, this explanation reinforced what was revealed at the time by WikiLeaks documents by providing intelligence equipment loyal to Saleh, the coordinates of the location of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, during his command of military operations in Saada, to Saudi Air Force, to target it as a site of the Houthi group. this incident represents the straw that broke the back of the close historical alliance between Saleh and Mohsen.

        Following the political movement in opposition to the Saleh regime, which accompanied the presidential elections in 2006, on January 13, 2007,  in the southern regions of Yemen, protest demonstrations, under the title of reconciliation and tolerance, led by the demobilized military, security and civilian jobs after the summer war of 94, and with the failure of the Saleh regime to respond to its demands, and face repression. beginning with live bullets on demonstrators, unlawful killings, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention, unfair trials, and violation of press freedoms, the "Southern Movement" stepped up its demands, and began in 2008, demanding the secession of southern Yemen from its north.  In 2009, a presidential committee was formed to address the problem, and issued its report, which was known as Hilal’s report insistently, monitored many of the excesses of Saleh and his regime, demanded accountability for those responsible for violations in the south, and warned of the loss of the south as a whole.

        Since the declaration of Yemeni unity, on May 22, 1990, and until 2010, the process of building state institutions was a long journey of random accumulation, burdened by the legacy files of the previous political conflicts to declare the establishment of unity between the two sides, in addition to new files, such as the aftermath of the summer war of 94, and the files of the six Saada wars and their effects. the files of political obstruction, from inheritance, to the problem of the integrity of elections, the shortcomings of the electoral register and the failure of the presidential system, in addition to the files of administrative and economic failure, from the inefficiency of services, institutions and organs, the increase in unemployment and poverty rates, and the prevalence of financial and administrative corruption of state organs and institutions.

        Over the two decades of the unity state, many exceptional opportunities have been squandered to build state institutions under the pressure of the concerns of staying in power, singling them out, and then under the motives of inheritance, as the main guide for the performance of the authorities of the Saleh regime, whose function was limited to protecting the ruling authority, not the state and society, while the domination of financial and administrative corruption. these factors have combined to accumulate empty structures, despite the huge resources that were devoured by their black holes, and so have created armies, formations, institutions and agencies with multiple loyalties, where the centers of influence share the various organs and institutions of the state, military, security and civilian, and under the rule of corruption armed regular armed forces, from the markets of the scrap of the Second World War. in a rare form of newer weapons, they have been executed in US-supervised destruction operations, with no state plan to monopolize weapons and legitimate means of force, and with tribal groups, irregular formations, and individuals increasingly acquiring weapons of all kinds on a large scale. 

        On top of that, since 2005, Yemen has joined the fragile State List, the numerous specialized international reports that Yemen, on its way to becoming a fragile and failed state, due to the evasion of the Saleh regime, which ruled Yemen for nearly three decades, repeatedly, from the commitments of reforms, economic, administrative, political, structural, military and security, where these warnings began, since the end of the twentieth century, in conjunction with the deepening and expansion of the crises, on more than one level, the situation of the Yemeni army, crumbling and eroding, weak security institutions, the most obvious expression of these crises, the most blatant. 

         According to the Global vulnerability Index, published annually since 2005 by the U.S. Peace Fund and the Journal of Foreign Policy, it covers 178 countries, topped by Yemen, ranking first in the fragile States Index, globally, since 2019, and for five consecutive years, in all indicators. from 2006 to 2014, Yemen has fluctuated from 24th to eighth place. 
       Since 2015, Yemen has started to jump forward in the ranks of fragile states, starting from seventh in the same year, then fourth in 2016 and 2017, and third in 2018. 

       After rounds of dialog between the opposition political parties and the ruling Saleh party, over the second half of the first decade of the current century, the parliamentary elections were postponed, beyond their constitutional and legal date, after the same parties had agreed to extend their cycle for two more years, pushed Yemen, by 2010, into a state of political deadlock. there are many political, economic, security and military crises.

       By the early weeks of 2011, Yemen was fully prepared for the outbreak of the popular uprising against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, within the framework of the so-called Arab Spring revolutions, which, successively, exposed many cracks in the structure of the ruling regime, and as the crisis worsened, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, through the Gulf Cooperation Council and with the support of the United Nations and the international community, has made strenuous efforts to prevent Yemen from sliding into civil war, and over the months of 2011, the Kingdom facilitated several rounds of consultations, during which the name of (Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi), Vice President Saleh, emerged. as a candidate to succeed Saleh in the presidency of Yemen for a transitional period, before he received a rare consensus by the parties of the Yemeni crisis, betting on the characteristics of weakness, fragility and lack inherent in the personality of the man, as characteristics and criteria of the trays, until the moment of signing of the Yemeni political parties, on November 23, 2011, at Al-Yamamah Palace in Riyadh, the Gulf Initiative (Saudi Arabia) and its chronic executive mechanism, signed between the General People’s Congress (ruling) party and its allies on the one hand, and between the Joint Meeting (opposition) and its partners on the other hand, under the auspices of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, which aimed to achieve a political settlement, including in accordance with its preamble, terms and contents: maintain Yemen’s unity, security and stability, meet the aspirations of the Yemeni people for change and reform, ensure a smooth and secure transition of power, and avoid Yemen slipping into chaos and violence, within the framework of a national consensus.

       As the government’s grip waned amid the so-called Arab Spring protests, on March 27, 2011, Ansar al-Sharia militants took control of the city of Jaar, and on May 29, 2011, the city of Zanzibar, the capital of Abyan governorate, about 50 kilometers to the east, from Aden. they declared it an "Islamic Emirate" and changed its name to "Qar" and declared the application of Islamic law, which they said was broken, as tens of thousands of residents were forced to flee to tents under trees in rural areas outside the city, and tens of thousands more crowded Aden, in schools and abandoned homes  .

         21 February 2012, following a mock election, the only candidate was officially named (Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi), born on September 1, 1945, in Abyan Governorate, southern Yemen, and the weak Vice President of the Republic of Yemen (Saleh) , from October 3, 1994, after the conclusion of the summer war of 1994, until February 20 , 2012, as President of the Republic of Yemen. succeeding the former President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh, after 33 years of rule in Yemen, where Yemen witnessed a political transition process, between 2012 and 2014, after the formation of the Government of National Accord, in partnership between the ruling party and the opposition parties, headed by Mohammed Salem Basindwa, within the framework of the implementation of the Gulf Initiative and its chronic executive mechanism, under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries, with the support of the United Nations, the UN Security Council, and the international community.

During the months of Yemen's transitional period, within the framework of the Gulf Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, and against the backdrop of local, regional and international support, and in light of the unprecedented vacancy that dominated Yemen's top leadership during the mere two years of Hadi's presidency and Basindwa's Government of National Accord, Yemen was pushed along a carefully crafted path to achieve a number of unspoken geopolitical goals. This can now be read by piecing together the pieces of the picture of the scene, its events and outcomes, after their relative completeness over nearly ten years of conflict, which can be traced and analysed to draw coherent conclusions about some of the facts and realities of the manipulation and detonation of the situation in Yemen. The first seeds of the cluster issues were planted by the presidency of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his son, Mohammed Nasser Ahmed, his defence minister.

In the fertile environment created by President Hadi and his defence minister, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group rapidly grew from a small group based in some rural districts of Saada governorate in northern Yemen to an armed formation that took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, by force on 21 September 2014, after all obstacles to stop its armed advance had been eliminated, from its first steps outside its stronghold in the mountains of Saada, through the fall of the governorate of Amran and the extension of its control to the governorate of al-Jawf, in the face of regional and international complicity, which at the time was interpreted as one of the gifts of the US-Iranian agreements, both lateral and free. in the mountains of Saada, by overthrowing the governorate of Amran and extending its control to the governorate of Al-Jawf.

The roles of (Hadi) and (Nasser) were not limited to not carrying out any of the responsibilities, tasks and duties of the President and the Minister of Defence of a state under normal and ordinary circumstances, or not carrying out any of the responsibilities, tasks and duties of the President and the Minister of Defence of a state undergoing a process of transition under extremely sensitive circumstances, or not to fulfill any of the requirements and conditions of the instinctive ambition to remain at the head of power and the head of the Ministry of Defence of a Third World country for as long as possible, although the two men were not ascetics of power, on the contrary, they were not ashamed of power. On the contrary, in their extremely rare moments of awakening from their semi-permanent comas in remote catacombs, Hadi and Nasser devoted all their meagre energies to consecrating, strengthening and standardising everything that contradicted these responsibilities, tasks, duties, demands and requirements, in all cases, circumstances, possibilities and scenarios, and together they provided a living example of what ambition without competence, without vision, without plans, without leadership and without effective management can do.

While President Hadi tried to manage the transition single-handedly in an attempt to extend his hold on power, relying mainly on his defence minister, Mohammed Nasser Ahmed, the UN envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, the Security Council's stick and sanctions man, and a small circle of technicians attached to his office, President Hadi effectively froze the work of the Supreme Military Committee, despite its successes, and then worked to ensure that the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was a formality. After effectively freezing the work of the Supreme Military Committee, despite its successes, and then working to make the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) a formality in terms of its convening and results, President Hadi launched an absurd process, with all its preliminaries and results, that dismantled and undermined the existing structures and organisation of the army under the title of Armed Forces Restructuring (AFR). It was nothing more than a formal and superficial movement of brigades and units of the armed forces, based on theoretical concepts that lacked science and methodology, that did not diagnose the reality of the military institution and did not address any of its problems, and which aimed at burning the stages in order to impose a forced direction that will ultimately lead to the extension of Hadi's presidency, contrary to the agreement signed between the political parties within the framework of the Gulf Initiative and its chronic executive mechanism, which set the end of the transitional period by holding presidential elections on 21 February 2014.

Despite the catastrophic results achieved on more than one level, this was not due to the effectiveness and efficiency of the negative roles played by Hadi and his defence minister, in the best and worst case scenarios of the roles of the two men, nor to the traps of conspiracies set by the supposed opponents of Hadi's rule. Rather, the worst situations in which Hadi's authority was trapped were created by Hadi and the partners and allies of his rule, which were diametrically opposed to the wishes and ambitions of the chorus of the transitional management, which worked disastrously under the heading of "The authority of President Hadi, who has limited abilities, knowledge, skills and perceptions, and whose disastrous efforts and those of his defence minister, combined with the state of conflict raging in the corridors of the structures and the administrative and financial apparatus of the state, with the deep fissures in the political, social, military, security, tribal and regional alliances, where these (disastrous) roles moved, interacted and intensified in an ideal environment, ultimately leading to a series of dramatic developments and accelerated dramatic outcomes on the Yemeni scene, up to the state of war.

Hadi's inadequate perception of his interests and ambitions to remain in power was based on several assumptions as guidelines for his internal and external policies, the most important of which are the goal of disrupting the completion of the tasks of the transitional processes and emptying them of their content, the goal of strengthening everything that weakens the influential political parties in the arena, primarily the Islah Party and its network of tribal, military, ideological and sectarian alliances, and the Congress Party and the wing of former President Saleh and its network of alliances, and the issue of the Saada and Houthi war as a pressure card.

 The Islah Party and its network of tribal, military, ideological and sectarian alliances, and the Congress Party and former President Saleh's wing and its network of alliances, with the aim of ensuring that the situation in the south deteriorates as a bargaining chip, and the issue of the Saada and Houthi wars in the north, in addition to the aim of stimulating the latent resentments of smaller and less weighty political forces such as the Socialist Party, the Nasserist Organisation, the Haq Party, the Union of Popular Forces, the Baath Party, and others.

As bad and disastrous as all the developments of the situation and all the results of the Yemeni scene, with all its major and minor stages, and with the multiplicity of local, regional and international actors involved in it, were, they did not come as a surprise, but were always the natural results of prerequisites that could not lead to other results under any circumstances, and the facts and realities will continue to prove this to any impartial approach, The fabrications, interpretations, conjectures and myths presented by the propaganda media about the plots to thwart Hadi and manage the transitional period are pure falsifications, in the context of attempts to impose all that is secondary, marginal, fabricated and invented from the facts, realities and causes that led the situation in Yemen to total collapse, in order to divert attention from the fact that the Yemeni people and the Yemeni people's rights are being violated, and that the Yemeni people and the Yemeni people's rights are being violated.

During the second half of 2011, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, Vice-President Saleh, assumed the duties of President of the Republic, after President Saleh was transferred to a hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for treatment following injuries sustained in the explosion that targeted President Saleh and most of the senior leaders of his regime on Friday 3 June 2011, at the height of the political crisis that followed the outbreak of popular protests in early 2011, when Hadi and his Defence Minister began supporting and funding the formation of irregular armed groups under the name of (Popular Committees) in parallel with the outbreak of popular protests in his hometown (Abyan).

After more than a year of the group's control over Abyan, the Yemeni air force launched a series of air strikes, in parallel with a series of (US) drone attacks, against Ansar al-Sharia's positions in Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan governorate, and Jaar, as well as in large parts of Abyan and Shabwa governorates. The air and ground attacks resulted in dozens of civilian casualties, following a wave of suicide bombings, car bombings and assassinations carried out by Ansar al-Sharia, as well as the detention of security personnel and soldiers.

On 12 May 2012, just weeks after Hadi officially assumed the presidency of Yemen, the Yemeni Ministry of Defence announced the start of a large-scale military operation to dislodge Al-Qaeda militants from the Abyan governorate, dubbed "Golden Swords", under the command of Major General Salem Ali Qattan, commander of the Yemeni army's southern region, comprising 25,000 troops, announced on Tuesday 12 June 2012 that the Yemeni army had regained control of Zinjibar, the capital of the southern governorate of Abyan, and the neighbouring city of Jaar, a day after Yemeni forces captured the strategic town of Shakra, which had served as a supply centre for al-Qa'ida elements in Jaar. Army units combed the two towns and other areas to flush out al-Qaeda pockets and remove mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) before al-Qaeda managed to deal a painful blow to the Yemeni army with the assassination of General Qattan on 18 June 2012, just two months after he was appointed commander of the Southern Military Zone in April 2012, replacing General Mahdi Maqula, a former ally of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was dismissed amid growing accusations that he had been complicit in allowing al-Qaeda to take over the governorate of Abyan.

Despite the Yemeni army's gains against Ansar al-Sharia in Abyan, President Hadi and Defence Minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmed used their powers to impose the replacement of the regular army, all state security agencies and all state institutions and agencies with militias (popular committees). The Hadi authorities handed over billions of riyals in budgets allocated to the Popular Committees, led by Abdul Latif al-Sayed, a former leader of Ansar al-Sharia, as the de facto authority ruling Abyan province since its liberation.

The commencement of Hadi's second year in office was marked by a state of political unrest in Yemen, characterised by the parachuting of individuals into military, security and civilian roles, as well as the formation of alliances with the Islah Party and other political entities. In response, President Hadi initiated a process of political realignment, which included the removal of several family members of his predecessor Saleh from their positions and the appointment of new governors. This led to a series of political and social upheavals. The conflict between the Islah Party and its network of military, tribal and ideological alliances on the one hand, and the Houthis on the other, can be seen as a consequence of Saleh's resentment and those who remained in his wake in the final stages of his presidency. This is in addition to the concerns, grudges and reservations held by Islah's allies in the Joint Bloc and in the revolution against Saleh.

Yemen has been the site of a series of significant incidents, commencing with the targeting of the air force, whether through bombings, assassinations, or the downing of multiple warplanes. This has been followed by the targeting of political security officers through assassinations, operations targeting military leaders, a surge in political assassinations, and terrorist attacks such as the assault on the Ministry of Defence complex. Despite the paramount importance of the transitional phase, a serious leadership vacuum was evident. Paradoxically, the newly elected President did not spend a single day in his official residence, the Presidential House or the Republican Palace. This lack of presidential presence coincided with a corresponding weakness in the government.

        From the Dammaj conflict in Sa'ada and a series of wars in the north of the country, in al-Jawf, Hajjah and Amran, it appears that President Hadi and his Minister of Defence may have played a role in fuelling the conflict between Islah Party formations, Salafists and tribal groups. While engaging with Houthi formations and groups, it is important to present the narrative that the state is not a party to these conflicts. Many forces were constrained by the Security Council sanctions, which were imposed with the intention of holding those who obstruct the political process accountable. This has led to challenges for the political elites, who have been distracted by quotas, intrigue, and revenge tendencies. The Houthi group has evolved from a small group in northern Yemen into an armed formation, encountering various challenges along the way.

          Since its initial steps outside its stronghold in the mountains of Saada, it has faced obstacles, including the complicity of Saleh and his allies from the leaders of the tribes around Sana'a, military commanders and security services. Additionally, the entry of the leftist elites, influenced by quotas, feuding and revengeful tendencies, has contributed to the complexities of the situation. It would appear that the elites of the left have been misled by the belief that the Houthi operation targets only the power centres, the Red House, the division and Al-Iman University. 

        It is also worth noting that many media outlets and elites have devoted themselves to the task of propaganda in favour of the Houthi agenda, which has resulted in a certain degree of confusion among the public. Following the Houthis' seizure of the city of Amran and the killing of the commander of the 310th Brigade, Hamid al-Qushaibi, Hadi made a visit to the city. During this visit, he made a statement that Amran had returned to the embrace of the state and that the group was advancing towards... The capital was protected by the Minister of Defence (Mohammed Nasser Ahmed) and President (Hadi) until the group imposed an armed siege on the capital Sana'a. This ended on 21 September 2014, when the group took control of the rest of the governorates by armed force.
        On 21 February 2015, President Hadi managed to outwit the Houthi militias by breaking his house arrest and fleeing from Sana'a to the southern city of Aden. In doing so, he repeated the same mistakes, starting with summoning the Popular Committees militias, which were still in control of Abyan Governorate since the second half of 2012 and throughout. In 2013 and 2014, they engaged in clashes with Houthi formations and pro-Saleh forces. They also managed to detain Defence Minister General Mahmoud al-Subaiehi, General Faisal Rajab, and President Hadi's brother, Nasser Mansour, by pure coincidence, as they advanced towards the city of Aden, before taking control of it. President Hadi's brother Nasser Mansour, by a stroke of good fortune, during their advance towards the city of Aden, before they assumed control of it, and the President (Hadi) sought refuge by land to Oman on the morning of Thursday 26 March 2015. He was graciously received on the same evening at the airport of the Saudi capital, Riyadh, by On the eve of the announcement of Operation Decisive Storm, which was led by Saudi Arabia and saw the participation of the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (except Oman) and other Arab countries, the Minister of Defence, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and the head of intelligence, Khaled al-Hamidan, led the efforts to address the situation in Yemen.

         In the course of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition's military operations, which were undertaken with the objective of restoring Hadi's legitimate authority, Hadi and his local, regional and international allies unfortunately repeated the same mistakes that led to the war. Unfortunately, new militias were created, and there were missed opportunities to rebuild the state's security, military, service and administrative institutions. It would seem that the areas wrested from the control of the Houthi group and Saleh's forces, especially the city of Aden, which was declared the temporary capital of the internationally recognised Hadi government, since the announcement of a naval, air and land military operation on 14 July 2015 to liberate the city from Ansar Allah Houthi forces and their then ally President Ali Abdullah Saleh, have been the focus of the coalition's attention. 

        On 26 December 2021, the transitional formations seized Shabwa governorate on 11 August 2022. They did so in a sudden and lightning operation after seizing Abyan governorate. In doing so, they imposed a new reality in the two governorates. They completely removed the authority of the Saudi-backed government forces. They replaced them with pro-UAE formations. They did this by taking advantage of the interactions created by the Ukrainian-Russian war.

        In the preceding paragraphs of this article, I have set out the facts of the record of those who have opposed the values, principles and goals of the glorious September and October revolutions. I have also identified the many traitors who have betrayed these values. It is important to understand that any simplification or reduction of these individuals to one ruling family is an oversimplification. One group, one station or one element. A mere reproduction of the ills of apostasy, betrayal and undermining to new generations. These generations are supposed to assume the duties and responsibilities of completing the achievement of the September and October revolutions in Yemen. They must assume the duties and responsibilities of completing the achievement of the goals, principles and objectives of the two Yemeni revolutions with integrity, independence and enlightenment. They must do so away from superficial debates, propaganda media titles, instruments, classifications and definitions, and the polarisation of the enemies of those principles, values and objectives, who lurk behind the barrels of guns and cannons along the lines of contact of war and undermining.