The Fragile Stability Concealing Dormant Seeds of Escalating Wars Rebels' Disputes

Introduction

In the aftermath of the uprisings that shook Yemen in September 1962 and October 1963, sparking rebellions against the Imamate and British colonial rule respectively, internal tensions among the rebels began to simmer. Political and ideological rifts, coupled with regional divides, surfaced within the revolutionary movements. Divergent perspectives on navigating the post-revolution landscape emerged, highlighting the challenges of unifying disparate factions to achieve the common goal of ousting oppressive regimes and colonial powers.

As the revolution forged ahead in its struggle against external adversaries, notably colonial forces in the south and the Imamate in the north, internal conflicts erupted, staining the revolutionary cause with bloodshed. These intra-rebel disputes and their reverberating repercussions served as the breeding ground for future political turmoil and armed conflicts. The persistent cycle of violence and internal strife within the revolutionary ranks mirrored a complex interplay of internal and external forces, shaping the trajectory of Yemen's tumultuous political landscape.

This article delves into the tumultuous period spanning from 1962 to 1970, encapsulating the September Revolution and the subsequent October Revolution from 1963 to 1969. It posits that the disagreements and disparities during these pivotal moments were followed by a semblance of stability across the nation. However, beneath this fragile calm, the seeds of discord lay dormant within Yemen's political and social fabric, ready to germinate into conflicts as factions emerged and allegiances shifted based on intricate motives deeply intertwined with the revolutionary fervor that ignited the nation.

The September 1962 Revolution

The September 1962 Revolution stands as a pivotal moment in Yemen's tumultuous history. The courageous "Free Officers," drawn from the ranks of Yemeni military and security personnel in Sana'a, Taiz, and Al Hodeida, spearheaded a daring campaign to upend the entrenched Imamate rule in northern Yemen. However, the journey towards revolution was riddled with challenges, as remnants loyal to the "Hameed Al-Din" house within the Imamate vehemently opposed the uprising, receiving bolstering support from influential regional powers.

Amidst the fervor of the revolution's early days, fierce clashes erupted, resulting in the loss of strategic territories in the eastern and northern regions to the Imamate loyalists. Confronted with this existential threat, the revolutionary leadership sought sanctuary in a defensive pact with the Republic of Egypt. This strategic alliance was forged in response to the alarming discovery of extensive support, armaments, and logistical aid flowing to their adversaries from Britain, a colonial power that had maintained a firm grip on southern Yemen since 1839.

Egypt began sending military support, including vehicles and soldiers, to Yemen, marking the onset of the first internal rifts within the revolutionary leadership regarding Egyptian assistance. Despite the majority of revolutionaries acknowledging the critical importance of this aid amidst the challenging circumstances facing the nascent revolution, some saw problematic issues arising from Egyptian intervention. This was particularly evident as the Egyptian military leadership in Sana'a primarily relied on Abdulrahman Al-Baidhani, who was appointed as the Deputy President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Vice President of the Republic.

 Additionally, he was appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, with the Foreign Ministry added to his portfolio shortly thereafter. Al-Baidhani also wielded significant influence over key military, security, and economic matters due to his close ties with Egyptian leadership in Cairo and Sana'a, particularly Anwar Sadat – the assistant to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser responsible for Yemen affairs. 

Consequently, some revolutionary leaders viewed the delegation of sovereign and sensitive matters solely to Al-Baidhani, to the exclusion of other members of the Revolutionary Command Council, in such precarious circumstances as detrimental to the revolution and its governance. They feared that this approach would not serve the revolution but rather incite internal and external backlash. The appointment of Al-Baidhani as Deputy to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, despite his civilian status in a military role, further fueled the anger of the revolutionaries, as military leaders perceived this appointment as a mockery of the armed forces. (Memoirs of Mohsen Al-Ayni, p. 52). 

In a revealing encounter between Marshal Abdullah Al-Sallal, the President of the Republic, and Judge Abdulrahman Al-Eryani, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, concerning the decisions favoring Al-Baidhani, Al-Sallal asserted that the Egyptian leadership obediently followed Al-Baidhani's directives. He stressed that the paramount concern was the revolution's preservation, indicating his willingness to cede leadership to Al-Baidhani if that aligned with Cairo's intentions. In response, Al-Eryani pointed out, "You and I are aware that Al-Baidhani acted as a spy for Imam Ahmed Al-Zubairi and Numan, on the Yemeni students in Cairo." (Memoirs of President Al-Eryani, Vol. 2, p. 32). 

Thus, Al-Baidhani became a contentious figure representing Egyptian influence in Yemen, igniting debates within the Revolutionary Command Council. Some contended that his conduct and rhetoric, including threats of spreading the revolution into Saudi territory, sowed enmity towards the revolution. Conversely, others believed that tolerating potential drawbacks from Al-Baidhani was preferable to leaving the revolution isolated without support, recognizing his importance to Egyptian backers of the revolution.

Whenever a revolutionary leader voiced criticism of Al-Baidhani or Egyptian officers' practices, or when suspicions arose about competition from him, the prospect of dismissal loomed. The initial casualty of this approach was Colonel Hamoud Al-Jaifi, the Defense Minister, a seasoned political and military figure who was a leading contender for assuming the revolution's leadership but ultimately declined. Subsequent expulsion orders targeted various revolutionary figures, spurred by Al-Baidhani's influence, culminating in the removal of Ahmed Mohamed Numan and Sheikh Mohamed Ali Othman. 

In the aftermath of Al-Baidani's mysterious disappearance post his expulsion, internal discord intensified over the handling of tribal relations and methods to secure support from tribes loyal to the House of Hamid Al-Din. This turmoil gave rise to two opposing factions within the revolutionary movement: one advocating for a forceful military approach to tribal dynamics, while the other emphasized diplomacy and persuasion to rally tribal allegiance. These contrasting viewpoints underscored a fundamental ideological rift within the revolution, as debates raged on the most effective strategy to navigate the intricate tribal landscape and unify support behind the revolutionary cause amidst a complex political environment.

Furthermore, a faction within the revolution began espousing a policy of non-aggression towards Saudi Arabia, a key supporter of the royalists in their conflict against the Republic. This faction sought to avoid aligning with the Egyptian stance towards Saudi Arabia to prevent Yemen from becoming a battleground for settling regional and international power scores.

 Therefore, they underscored the necessity of directing attention towards internal affairs, the triumph of the revolution, and the consolidation of the republic. Conversely, some leaders believed that standing in solidarity with Egypt against Saudi Arabia was a national Arab duty in the face of the Americans and their Saudi allies. (Excerpts from Mohsen Al-Ayni's Memoirs).

Substantial disagreements arose on various fronts, including the executions of individuals implicated in collaborating with the Imamate regime. Notably, some revolutionaries faced accusations from their comrades and were not spared from these executions, intensifying and widening existing divisions. These disputes prompted several swift governmental changes.

 Concurrently, a shift transpired in the state's leadership structure, transitioning from the initial Revolutionary Command Council to an Executive Council, and culminating in a Republican Council.

In the tumultuous year of 1966, internal divisions within the government and the Republican Council reached a boiling point, culminating in the dramatic resignation of Prime Minister General Hassan Al-Amri from both the council and his premiership. Amidst growing suspicions that the royalists were leveraging Egyptian support to tighten their grip, a faction of council members and government officials took a stand against Al-Amri, aiming to remove him from power. As all attempts at reconciliation faltered, a majority of government officials found themselves compelled to journey to Cairo in search of Egyptian intervention to quell the deepening discord.

Upon their arrival in Cairo, the Egyptian authorities swiftly detained the officials, holding them in custody for nearly a year. This crackdown fueled widespread discontent against President Al-Sallal and his Egyptian allies. Upon the return of the detained officials to Sanaa, they swiftly mobilized to dismantle Al-Sallal's regime. The regime change unfolded during Al-Sallal's departure from the country on a foreign visit, orchestrated by the "November 5th Movement" of 1967. Authority shifted to a Republican Council under the leadership of Judge Abdul Rahman Al-Eryani.

Against the backdrop of ongoing conflict with the royalists, who made significant territorial gains, including the encirclement of the capital city of Sanaa, the revolutionary and republican forces banded together to confront the looming threat. Throughout various provinces, the populace rallied behind the armed forces and key political and military figures, ultimately securing a pivotal victory for the revolution in early 1968. This triumph marked the lifting of the siege and the gradual weakening of the Imamate forces.

In just six months, renewed conflicts erupted among the factions of the revolution, splitting the ideological, political, and military forces that had united against the remnants of the Imamate into two main camps. Leading the first faction was Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Al-Amri, while standing on the other side was Chief of Staff Abdulraqeeb Abdulwahab, supported by several left-leaning military unit leaders. The crux of the dispute revolved around the authority of the Chief of Staff, particularly heightened with the arrival of a new shipment of weapons at the port of Hodeida, leading to bloody clashes on the 23rd and 24th of August 1968.

The confrontations concluded with the triumph of the first faction, resulting in the arrest and pursuit of leaders from the opposing side, leading to the elimination of some, notably the Chief of Staff. Consequently, this faction began to view the September revolution as having suffered a setback, having been overthrown through the November 5th Movement, opposed by the leftists, and the August confrontations that targeted their symbols and leaders within the armed forces, police, and other state institutions.

Overall, the leftists emerged as the forefront of the political opposition to the ruling regime in North Yemen, particularly following the wide-reaching repercussions of the August 1968 events, intertwined with regional and ideological factors within the republican ranks themselves. Meanwhile, the Imamate forces continued to seek to undermine the revolution and the republican system.

However, the reconciliation agreement with royalist loyalists in 1970, brokered under the auspices of Saudi sponsorship, deepened preexisting divisions within the revolutionary movement. The opposition forces, primarily aligned with leftist ideologies, viewed the restoration of the Imamate as stipulated in the reconciliation pact as a betrayal of the November 5th Movement's uprising against the September revolution, perceiving it as a deviation from the revolution's original objectives. This development further strained the fragile unity among the revolutionary factions and heightened tensions within the political landscape of Yemen.

In essence, the conflicts and armed confrontations that unfolded during the events of August 1968 can be seen as the catalyst for the emergence of subsequent disputes and clashes under different guises and timelines. These conflicts, rooted in diverging ideologies and ambitions, continued to resurface intermittently, fueling a cycle of unrest and discord that persisted over time. The complex interplay of political, military, and regional dynamics further fueled the flames of discord, setting the stage for a series of interconnected conflicts that shaped the course of history in Yemen during that tumultuous period.

The October 1963 Revolution in South Yemen

In South Yemen, various organizations, political parties, unions, and associations emerged, including the Sons of the South League in 1951, the Labor Congress in 1956, and the labor unions in Aden. These groups opposed the British authorities' efforts to suppress union activities and protests. The Ba'ath Party branch, established in 1956 but waned after Syria's separation from the union with Egypt in 1961, as well as the Arab Nationalists Movement branch founded in 1959, led by Faisal Abdul Latif Al-Shaabi, and the People's Democratic Union established by Abdullah Ba Dib in 1961, which embraced Marxist ideologies.

Protests against British occupation in Aden intensified following the Egyptian July Revolution of 1952. Political forces and labor unions led mass opposition against the occupation during the 1950s. About a year after the September revolution in the North against the Imamate rule, the October 1963 Revolution erupted against British occupation in the South. The National Front, comprising the Arab Nationalists Movement branch and several other organizations sharing the goal of ending foreign occupation in South Yemen, played a prominent role in the revolution. They formed a military arm in various southern provinces, successfully capturing and controlling several areas.

Simultaneously, the Liberation Front, backed by Egypt, maintained a presence and influence comparable to the National Front in certain regions. All attempts to unify the two fronts under one umbrella failed, as did efforts to ease tensions between them. Disagreements escalated, culminating in the outbreak of war within Aden neighborhoods in mid-1967, decisively won by the National Front. They subsequently seized control of most areas, leading to their assumption of power, expulsion of the occupiers, and the declaration of independence, establishing an independent republic in South Yemen under the leadership of the National Front. This forced the Liberation Front and other factions to leave the country, as the ruling National Front considered all other political entities prohibited.

In the aftermath of the revolution, the National Front consolidated its power, giving rise to a leftist faction with Marxist inclinations seeking to implement socialist ideals akin to the Eastern bloc under Soviet leadership. However, this vision clashed with the opposing faction led by President Qahtan Al-Shaabi and Prime Minister Faisal Al-Shaabi, supported by key military figures.

Nonetheless, at the pivotal fourth conference of the National Front in early 1968, tensions reached a boiling point as the leftist faction, championing revolutionary ideals and advocating for the implementation of scientific socialism along with a thorough restructuring of state institutions, clashed with the opposing faction. The discussions and debates that unfolded during this gathering underscored the deep-rooted ideological and political divisions within the revolutionary movement, laying bare the challenges and complexities of navigating differing visions for the future of Yemen. The outcome of this conference would have far-reaching implications for the trajectory of the revolution and the course of events in the turbulent landscape of post-independence Yemen.

The initial power struggle saw the military seizing control, detaining leftist leaders and cracking down on their supporters in March 1968. The leftist camp bided its time, awaiting the opportune moment to stage a countermove. In June 1969, they orchestrated a bold takeover, asserting absolute dominance over all state apparatus in what they termed the "Rectification Movement." This initiative led to the elimination of Faisal Al-Shaabi, the imprisonment and eventual demise of President Qahtan Al-Shaabi, and the relentless pursuit of civilian and military adversaries.
The ruling leftist faction in post-revolution South Yemen initially managed to establish a semblance of stability, yet the emergence of internal divisions regarding the adoption of either Chinese or Soviet socialist models introduced a new layer of complexity. Despite the faction aligned with the Soviet approach scoring a temporary victory by purging its adversaries, the resurfacing of internal discord reignited conflicts and power struggles within the faction, intensifying the already tumultuous political landscape of the region and highlighting the challenges of navigating ideological differences amidst the pursuit of power and control. 

The Conclusion

Indeed, the September and October revolutions in Yemen took root in a complex web of internal and external circumstances, drawing participation from diverse factions of the population in the north and south. Nevertheless, internal dissension quickly fractured the ranks of the revolutionaries, a recurring theme in Arab uprisings, with the Yemeni revolutions falling prey to this pattern. As narrated by the late Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qasim in a conversation with the Yemeni statesman and diplomat Mohsen Al-Ayni on the eve of the September revolution, Qasim, a key figure in the 1958 Iraqi revolution, urged the Yemenis to unite and resist allowing differences to sow division among them, regardless of the underlying causes. Regrettably, the Yemenis failed to heed the counsel of the Iraqi leader, as they grappled with their own internal disputes. Merely five months later, Qasim paid the ultimate price for his internal conflicts when his Ba'athist adversaries orchestrated a coup, leading to his swift trial and execution.

The Yemeni revolutionaries in the south inherited the remnants of a colonial administration in Aden, alongside emirates and sultanates scattered across various provinces, while their counterparts in the north confronted a feudal monarchy that governed through archaic imamate structures. Hailing from diverse segments of society and a spectrum of prevailing intellectual and political currents, the revolutionaries embodied a mosaic of ideologies and backgrounds that laid the groundwork for the disagreements that would shape the revolution and its aftermath. These internal schisms emerged as the hallmark of the unfolding events, developments, and repercussions, with external relationships of the revolutionaries playing a crucial role in steering the course of the revolution and statecraft. These external entanglements left an indelible mark on the overall trajectory of events, notably fueling the conflicts and disputes that erupted among the various components and factions of the revolution.

These internal divisions planted their seeds in fertile soil, fostering the continuity of divergences, even when dormant, only to resurface in subsequent phases as armed conflicts and bloody confrontations. These conflicts have come to define the Yemeni landscape – both in the north and south – since the inception of the September and October revolutions over half a century ago.