What is happening in eastern Yemen?

Despite its "symbolic" withdrawal from Yemen on July 8, 2019, the UAE has kept its fingers active and eyes open over the entire eastern provinces of Yemen, from Abyan to Shabwa, to the coastal and valley areas of Hadramaut, and to Mahra on the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman, reaching all the way to Socotra Island in the Indian Ocean. This was after the UAE had imposed a new reality by undermining the internationally recognized government’s presence in its temporary capital, Aden, on August 24, 2019, and empowering the Southern Transitional Council (STC) formations, then by sabotaging the Riyadh Agreement and the Presidential Leadership Council.

Additionally, the UAE conducted a series of surprise operations to complicate the situation in Yemen, aiming to extend its influence across the entire Gulf of Aden up to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, Meon Island, the port of Mocha, and a long coastal strip on the Red Sea, including Socotra Island in the Indian Ocean. In line with its boundless ambitions, the UAE intensified its support for the STC formations throughout the war with the internationally recognized government forces in the Sheikh Salim area in Abyan Governorate, which erupted simultaneously with the STC's takeover of the temporary capital, Aden. The UAE also managed to oust Shabwa Governor Muhammad bin Adiyo.

With the announcement on Thursday, November 11, 2021, of a unilateral and sudden withdrawal by the Republic Guards or National Resistance formations led by Tariq Saleh and supported by the UAE, from their advanced positions south of Hodeidah City—an area estimated at about 100 kilometers along the western coast adjacent to international maritime lines in the Red Sea—the region was handed over to the Houthi Ansar Allah. Meanwhile, the UAE-affiliated formations conducted a surprise and swift operation to seize Shabwa Governorate on August 11, 2022, after taking Abyan Governorate and imposing a new reality in both provinces, replacing Saudi-backed government forces with its own affiliated formations. The UAE exploited the dynamics created by the Ukraine-Russia war, amidst growing American and British interest in these areas, evidenced by visits from numerous diplomatic, military, and security delegations to Hadramaut and Mahra.

As a pressure tactic on Saudi Arabia, the UAE instigated the war in Sudan, which erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese army supported by Saudi Arabia on one side and the Rapid Support Forces, backed by the UAE, on the other. Meanwhile, the UAE intensified its escalation activities aimed at destabilizing Hadramaut Valley. Following the announcement of the prominent leaders Faraj al-Bahsani and Abdulrahman al-Mahrmi joining the Southern Transitional Council, the council, with its leaders, forces, and armored vehicles, moved to Mukalla. There, the National Assembly meetings were held on May 21 and 22, 2023, amidst opposition from many Hadhrami figures and components.

For months, the UAE has shifted to a new pattern of behavior in Yemen, aiming to secure a series of agreements to gain control over several vital sectors.

In response, Saudi Arabia effectively facilitated extensive consultations between a broad range of influential Hadhrami figures and components, held in Riyadh over a month. This led to the announcement of the formation of the Hadhramaut National Council on June 21, 2023. Subsequently, the President of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad Al-Alimi, announced the granting of full autonomy to Hadhramaut Governorate and, along with a Saudi delegation, launched a comprehensive development plan. These steps halted the UAE's escalation and spared Hadhramaut Valley and its coast from imminent conflict.

Over the following months, the UAE adapted its approach in Yemen, seeking to secure agreements aimed at controlling key sectors, providing cover for its geopolitical ambitions at the expense of both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This includes the "Military and Security Cooperation and Counter-Terrorism Agreement," signed on December 8, 2022, agreements for oil sales and marketing, and communications agreements.

Amid the focus on the war in Gaza and Houthi operations in the Red Sea, Hadhramaut in eastern Yemen witnessed serious developments on Wednesday, January 17, 2024. A military force of fifty armed vehicles and five trucks from the newly formed National Shield Forces, supported by Saudi Arabia, moved from Seiyun in Hadhramaut Valley to Hisheisa in Mukalla, the governorate’s capital, according to the directive of Hadhramaut Governor Mabkhout bin Madi. However, a force from the Al-Joul Al-Qurashim camp, affiliated with the UAE-supported elite forces, intercepted and stopped them in the Al-Joul Al-Qurashim (Al-Dar Al-Bayda) area in Wadi Al-Ayn and Hurra district, which lies between the First and Second Military Regions. This created a military tension that required intervention by the coalition forces commander, Major General Sultan Al-Buqami, who met with coalition leaders at Al-Riyan Airport and then with the Hadhramaut Governor, his deputies, and security and military leaders. The Southern Transitional Council in Hadhramaut expressed its absolute rejection of any forces entering the Hadhramaut coast, urging the local population to support the Hadhrami elite forces and resist attempts to weaken and overthrow them. The council held the responsible party that permitted the forces' entry into Mukalla accountable, warning of escalation if the forces did not withdraw.

Simultaneously, many prominent figures in Shabwa announced the formation of the Shabwa National Council on January 16, 2024, mirroring the Hadhramaut National Council. Meanwhile, hundreds of protesters, supported by tribal components, continued their peaceful sit-in in the Al-Aqla area of Shabwa, demanding reductions in fuel prices, despite being attacked, which resulted in several injuries.

These developments recall a series of related events in Hadhramaut and Yemen, revealing the UAE's boundless ambitions in Yemen and the phases of Saudi-UAE relations in Yemen and the region. These phases began with close alliance, moved to divergence, then competition, and now conflict amidst conflicting interests.

Any leniency could lead to further complications and dangerous transformations that are difficult to address and manage on multiple levels.

Since the announcement of coalition operations in Yemen on March 26, 2015, the UAE has focused on acquiring vital areas in Yemen, particularly ports overlooking maritime routes that could negatively impact the Jebel Ali port and Dubai ports if operationalized. Therefore, it aimed to control these areas by establishing military bases or empowering armed formations loyal to it, extending its influence over ports such as Mukalla, Shabwa, Aden, Mocha, Meon Island, the Greater and Lesser Hanish Islands, Bab al-Mandab, and Socotra Island in the Indian Ocean.

A close examination of the distribution of influence across the Yemeni map after nine years of war will clearly reveal severe distortions and imbalances. The Houthi group, allied with Iran, controls a large area covering about ten governorates with the largest population concentrations. This is followed by areas under the control of the Southern Transitional Council formations and other UAE-affiliated groups, covering about seven governorates with key strategic locations. The area controlled by Saudi allies is limited to a few districts, including two in Marib, about four in Taiz, three in Hadhramaut Valley, and districts in the Mahra Governorate. This situation has been carefully engineered for geopolitical objectives that are in complete opposition to the national security of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and their interests.

An effective initiative to address the distortions in eastern Yemen for the benefit of Yemeni state institutions will necessarily impact the broader framework of addressing the war file in Yemen. Any leniency in the situation will lead to new levels of complexity and dangerous transformations that are difficult to remedy and manage their repercussions on multiple fronts.