Western Conspiracies

Between October 22 and 24, 1956, a secret and dangerous alliance was formed between three countries: France, Britain, and the Zionist entity. The mission of this triangular alliance was to devise a covert plan to punish Egypt and, specifically, President Gamal Abdel Nasser for his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal.

Now, 68 years later, the essence of such conspiracies remains unchanged, executed in the same manner. At the time, the meeting was held in Sèvres, France—a place that had always been a hub for conspiracies. In 1920, colonial powers met there to divide the spoils of the "sick man of Europe." When people fail to heed the lessons of history, it often repeats itself, sometimes with a tinge of irony. This failure to learn is evident today, as the United States, Britain, France, and the same small state conspire once again to erase what remains of the region, all while outwardly advocating peace.

The Suez Canal

In 1869, the Suez Canal was inaugurated, and from its inception, it held immense strategic value for Britain, as it significantly facilitated communication between Britain and the distant parts of its empire. In the 20th century, the canal gained additional importance as it provided a direct route from Europe to the Gulf oil fields, keeping Churchill's promises alive.

Following the outbreak of World War I, Britain declared Egypt a protectorate and part of its possessions. In February 1915, Turkish forces approached the canal but were repelled by the British, who launched an offensive and captured Sinai and Palestine. In 1918, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and its Arab territories were divided between Britain and France.

Nationalization of the Canal

Tensions between Britain and Egypt escalated with the rise of Arab nationalism, culminating in Egypt's July Revolution of 1952. In February 1955, Britain refused to sell arms to Egypt, leading to a further deterioration in relations. Egypt turned to the Soviet Union for an arms deal. In July 1956, relations between the two countries worsened when Britain and the United States, having promised to assist Nasser in financing the construction of the Aswan Dam, reneged on their commitment due to Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet Union. In response to this refusal, on July 26, 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal to use its revenues to fund the dam's construction.

The Sèvres Protocols

The nationalization of the Suez Canal came as a shock to Britain and France, both of which lacked the immediate military capability to control the canal. Meanwhile, global public opinion supported Egypt. France had significant military forces in Algeria, and Britain had a large military presence in Jordan. This situation allowed Egypt to adopt a more flexible position, particularly concerning the canal's usage, assuring the unimpeded passage of ships through the Suez Canal (except for Israeli ships). Under such conditions, military actions by Britain and France would lack Western support.

A secret meeting was held in Sèvres, France, on October 22, 1956. Representing Israel were Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, and Defense Ministry Director General Shimon Peres. France was represented by Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, and Chief of Staff Maurice Challe. Britain was represented by Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and his assistant Sir Patrick Dean.

Negotiations lasted 48 hours, culminating in the signing of a secret protocol. According to the plan, Israel was to attack Egypt, prompting Britain and France to invade the Suez Canal area, claiming their actions aimed to "protect the canal and separate the warring parties." At the end of the war, Israel was expected to annex all of Sinai or at least its eastern third, extending along the Arish–Sharm el-Sheikh line. Israel also pledged not to attack Jordan, and Britain promised not to assist Jordan if it attacked Israel.

Initially, Ben-Gurion proposed a plan to redraw the Middle Eastern borders based on Chaim Weizmann's vision of a "New Middle East." According to this plan, Jordan was to be dismantled, with its eastern territories merged into Iraq and its western territories annexed by Israel. Southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River, was to be ceded to Israel, with Lebanon becoming a Christian-majority republic allied with Israel. However, the French and British rejected this plan and persuaded Ben-Gurion to focus on Egypt.

After signing the Sèvres agreements, Britain and France began concentrating their forces in areas suitable for strikes against Egypt’s coasts and airfields. Large quantities of arms were urgently supplied to Israel. French troops landed at Israeli airfields, French ships positioned themselves off the coast of Palestine, and Israel began mass mobilization of its reserves, citing the "potential entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan."

On October 29, 1956, Israel launched Operation Kadesh in Sinai. As part of the operation, Israeli forces attacked Egyptian army positions in the Sinai Peninsula, justifying the invasion as a necessary response to fedayeen attacks from Gaza.

The Egyptian leadership did not anticipate an Israeli attack. On the day of the assault, Egyptian Chief of Staff Abdel Hakim Amer and several senior Egyptian officers were engaged in discussions in Jordan and Syria. On the night of October 28, an Israeli fighter jet shot down a plane carrying an Egyptian military delegation returning from Syria to Egypt, killing 18 officers. However, Amer survived and returned to Egypt on another flight.

Under a secret agreement with Israel, Britain and France vetoed a U.S.-proposed UN Security Council resolution calling on Israel to cease its aggression against Egypt. Instead, they presented their demands, urging both sides to withdraw their forces 30 kilometers from the Suez Canal. Egypt refused to comply, prompting military action by Britain and France.

In a speech to the Knesset on November 7, 1956, Ben-Gurion declared the Sinai campaign "the greatest and most glorious in the history of the Israeli people." He announced that the Israeli army had occupied Sinai, once part of Solomon’s kingdom, stretching from Tiran Island in the Red Sea to the hills of Lebanon. Ben-Gurion hinted at the potential annexation of Sinai, stating that the Israeli army "had not invaded Egyptian territory" and that "the operation was limited to the Sinai Peninsula." He asserted that the 1949 armistice lines were no longer valid.

Several nations cautiously criticized the actions of Britain, France, and Israel. However, the Soviet Union’s response was more assertive. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev threatened Britain, France, and Israel with decisive actions, including missile strikes on their territories. Such developments risked a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Consequently, the U.S. demanded its allies halt their aggression in the Middle East. On November 2, 1956, an emergency session of the UN General Assembly called for a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt, and the reopening of the Suez Canal.

Under the threat of international isolation and global conflict, Britain and France withdrew their forces from Egypt by December 1956. Israel withdrew from occupied territories in March 1957 under U.S. pressure, as the U.S. threatened sanctions. President Eisenhower emphasized that Israel's withdrawal from Sinai did not imply Egypt's right to re-blockade the Straits of Tiran against Israeli ships, warning of severe consequences if Egypt violated the armistice conditions.

The campaign was halted through the joint efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union. This rare instance of consensus during that era was driven by different motives. The Soviet Union, as in contemporary Syria, was unwilling to see its ally destroyed by a "potential adversary," while the United States aimed to prevent its NATO allies from acting independently of Washington. Meanwhile, attempts to bring the issue to the Security Council were blocked by British and French vetoes. Subsequently, an emergency General Assembly session demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the deployment of peacekeepers to Egypt. With Soviet warnings of "decisive actions" against aggressors, the withdrawal of forces commenced. Britain and France withdrew by December 22, 1956, and Israel followed in March 1957. By November 15, 1956, 3,300 UN peacekeepers were deployed in the canal zone.

According to Middle East expert Andrei Ostalski in a BBC interview, the Suez Crisis represented a complete defeat for Britain and France. However, Israel still reaped benefits, including the lifting of the blockade on Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran. Additionally, during its occupation of Sinai, Israel looted valuable resources. In the Sèvres Protocols, the three powers coordinated their actions with calculated precision, providing a false cover for the invasion—similar to the Iraq War, where Bush and Blair insisted Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.

According to the secret agreement, Israel was supposed to initiate the aggression, ostensibly to suppress attacks carried out by fedayeen fighters based in Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene in the conflict as neutral and impartial forces to stop the attacks and ensure the security of the Suez Canal. In reality, the three powers had coordinated their actions from the beginning, setting the goal of toppling Nasser and changing Egypt's regime. Israel, seeking an opportunity to achieve this, decided to exploit the situation and reach an agreement with the British and the French to resolve previous misunderstandings for practical purposes.

For the French, beyond their interest in the Suez Canal, there was another factor that was perhaps even more significant: Egypt's role as a key supporter of the Algerian revolutionaries. The war for Algerian independence was ongoing, and Paris was unwilling to acknowledge defeat and withdraw from Algeria. This was a central national issue for France, making the idea of weakening Egypt or possibly removing Nasser altogether highly appealing.

As for the British, everything was clear. The Suez Canal was the most important commercial artery and the primary route for supplying Middle Eastern oil to Europe. Controlling it was a matter of prestige and the essence of empire. The political and military defeat not only led to the collapse of Anthony Eden’s government but also marked the end of the strategy to maintain the entire British Empire.

The conflict over the Suez Canal was a turning point in world history, particularly in Britain’s history. In 1956, the question of decolonization and the dissolution of the empire was decisively settled.

Israel, which had significant disagreements with Britain at the time, found an opportunity to end these disputes through a secret agreement with Britain regarding a military strike on Egypt. This allowed Israel to test its aggression against the Arabs under the guise of neutrality in the eyes of the international community, making it appear as though Israel was not responsible.

In any case, how often have you heard Western lamentations over the Sèvres Agreement and the disgraceful role of Britain and Israel in attacking a defenseless Egypt? There is no lamentation. All you hear is rhetoric about the kind of relationships the West wants to establish with the Arab and Islamic world—relationships that remain active and effective. So, this time, when the West cries out against Russia for striking a treaty with North Korea, make sure to ask them about their breaches of agreements, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Sèvres Protocol, and the new British-German treaty.