Regional and Great-Power Competition in Bab al-Mandab

The Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea are witnessing an escalation that increased with the outbreak of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on October 7, when the Palestinian factions launched an armed attack on the Gaza envelope area (settlements), followed by large-scale military operations targeting the Gaza Strip and the occupied Palestinian territories. Consequently, one of its repercussions outside the Palestinian borders was a series of operations targeting Israeli ships by the Ansar Allah group (Houthis) in the Red Sea waters off the Yemeni coast.

Apart from that escalation and the related developments, despite their importance, the issue of the security of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea is not an incidental issue that began in conjunction with the current wave of conflict in Palestine. Rather, it has been an important and essential issue over the past decades that has been associated with many international, regional, and local stations, events, and transformations, including the current round of conflict in Yemen, which erupted after the Ansar Allah group (Houthis) took control of Yemen's capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. Then, by the announcement of the military operations of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on March 26, 2015, and after that by the establishment of local armed formations with multiple backgrounds and loyalties, which, at least in the first year of the war, combined and united under the title "confronting the Houthis and Saleh,".

Throughout the ten years of conflict, the issue of Bab al-Mandab has not been a secondary or incidental matter for many international, regional, and local actors involved directly or indirectly in the conflict, but it has always been a major issue to steer the course of the conflict and its paths. The international and regional actors have deliberately engineered precise and complex borders for the map of Taiz governorate, according to the importance of its location and its geographical and administrative borders, which overlook one of the most important international waterways, represented by the Bab al-Mandab Strait and its geographical area on the Red Sea.

Hence, the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, in integration with the Gulf of Aden, serve as a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, through which a significant share of oil and gas exports coming from the Arabian Gulf passes through the Suez Canal, or the SUMED pipeline via both the Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz. Further, the importance of the Bab al-Mandab Strait is also represented as a southern gateway to the Red Sea and is of great importance in today’s global system, geographically, politically, economically, militarily, and security-wise.

On the other hand, the accurate and complex international and regional calculations of the issues related to the Bab al-Mandab are based not only on its multidimensional strategic importance as a vital strait for international maritime traffic and as a vital artery linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden with the Indian Ocean and between Asia and Africa, but are also based on a lived experience in which the Bab al-Mandab Strait was used as a decisive factor in a battle of strategic geopolitical importance during the Egyptian-Israeli war, which ended with Egypt's historic victory over Israel in October 1973. During that period of war, Bab al-Mandab was completely closed from October 6 to November 1, 1973, in the face of the naval ships heading to Israel across the Red Sea. At a time when Israel was importing about 18 million tons of oil from Iran alone at that time, which were being transported through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea to the strategic port of Eilat, located on the northern coast of the Red Sea, south of Israel. This sea lane plays a major role in facilitating the movement of goods and commodities directly between Israel and other countries on the one hand and between Europe and Asia on the other hand.

Therefore, the high Israeli and Western fear of any possibility of repeating this experience through the use of Bab al-Mandab at any level of potential conflict in the region is based on the great importance that the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea represent for the world in general and for Israel in particular, whether in terms of the economic aspect or in terms of the military, security, and geopolitical aspect.

Over the past decades, many headlines have emerged related to the issue of the security of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, perhaps the most prominent of which are: operations related to "American and Western Influence," "Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" rounds, "American and Western Competition with China," "American and Western Conflict with Russia," and before that, with the "Soviet Union." In addition to "The Security of Energy and Commodity Supplies," the "War on Terrorism" following the "attacks of September 11, 2001," the "USS Cole Bombing" off the coast of Yemen in late 2000, the "Invasion of Iraq," operations to track down "Somali Pirate Ghosts" after they seized a number of ships while they were crossing the waters of the Red Sea, "The Conflict with Iran and its Allies," "The war in Syria," "The war in Yemen," "Sudan's War," "Russia-Ukraine war," ending with the "War in Gaza" and the operations of the "Houthi group" in retaliation for the Israeli army's bombardment of Gaza.

Moreover, the importance of Yemen's strategic location overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden doubles with the emergence of China's massive Belt and Road Initiative in its multiple dimensions. It is the project that was announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time in late 2013 and which was officially launched in March 2015, under the name of "Vision and Action," as a vast network and collection of huge development and investment initiatives. The Chinese project includes creating a vast network of land roads and highways, huge bridges, high-speed railways, and train stations, in addition to a network of maritime routes and navigation lines, large regional ports and harbors, and land infrastructure, connecting China with the three continents—Asia, Africa, and Europe—and covering more than 72 countries, including 75% of the world's population.

“The Bab al-Mandab Strait, along with Mayun Island, Jabal Sheikh Saeed, other Yemeni islands, Dhubab district, and Yemeni ports such as Al-Makha, Al-Al-Hodeidah, Al-Khawkha, and Saleef, in addition to the long strip of coastline on the Red Sea and the strategic location on the maritime shipping lines towards the Indian Ocean and Africa, also represent central points of contact for Yemen and its shared geopolitical interests with the countries of the Horn of Africa.” Yemen, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and Red Sea

Yemen has a long coastal strip along the waters of the Gulf of Aden, the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, and the international maritime shipping lanes parallel to Al-Makha, the western coast, and Al-Al-Hodeidah. So, one of the important angles worth noting about Yemen's strategic location, overlooking regional and international lines of contact of strategic security, military, and navigational importance, is that Yemen intersects with Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Palestine (Israel), through the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, down to the Gulf of Aqaba, through the waters of the Red Sea, and in parallel, Yemen intersects with Somalia, Oman, Iran, and India, across the waters of the Arabian Sea, starting from the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Oman, and the Strait of Hormuz, which are key intersections in the structure of the regional and global security system.

Therefore, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, along with Mayun Island, Jabal Sheikh Saeed, other Yemeni islands, Dhubab district, and the Yemeni ports, such as Al-Makha, Al-Al-Hodeidah, Al-Khawkhah, and Saleef, in addition to the long coastal strip on the Red Sea and the strategic location on the maritime shipping lines towards the Indian Ocean and Africa, also represent central points of contact for Yemen and its shared geopolitical interests with the countries of the Horn of Africa, as a vital area for exchanging economic and geopolitical interests and benefits.

On the opposite side of Yemen, the Bab al-Mandab Strait is overseen by the island of Ras Doumeira in the Gulf of Tadjoura in Djibouti. This country, despite its small size, has a strategic port that is a major corridor for Ethiopia's exports and imports. Accordingly, due its strategic location, there are six advanced military bases for several countries, used for defense, intelligence, and logistical support, such as the French military base since Djibouti's independence in 1977, when it was colonized by France at that time; the US Navy base in the capital, Djibouti, since 2002; the Spanish military base since 2008; the Japanese military base since 2011, the Italian military base since 2013, and the Chinese military base since 2017, as well as the nascent Emirati presence under commercial cover. In addition to those military bases in many areas around Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, and the region, many countries operate international naval forces’ battleships on a regular basis, under the title of ensuring the security and safety of international navigation and combating terrorism.

In addition to Djibouti, Yemen borders on the other side of the Red Sea—on the front lines of the continent of Africa—both the state of Somalia with its most important ports, "the port of Bosaso in the vital region of Puntland and the port of Berbera in the Somaliland region," and also the state of Eritrea with its most important ports, "Assab and Massawa." Due to the geopolitical importance of the Horn of Africa region— the fourth largest peninsula in the world, which is located in the eastern part of the African mainland and consists of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti; the broader definitions of this region also include parts of Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania, as the Horn of Africa extends along the southern border of the Red Sea, extending hundreds of kilometers into the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, the Guardafoi Strait, and the Indian Ocean—many countries are competing to strengthen their influence and interests in it, on top of those countries: France, the United States of America, Turkey, Qatar, and Iran, in addition to China, Israel, the UAE, and most recently Saudi Arabia.

“One of the headlines revealing the efforts of decades of undermining, weakening, guardianship, hegemony, and subservience is Saudi Arabia, 44 years after the assassination of President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi and his initiative on the Red Sea to establish an entity of the Red Sea countries with the aim of enhancing security, investment, and development in the countries bordering the sea.”

The Security System of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea

In an initiative conscious of Yemen's interests, President Ibrahim al-Hamdi, President of North Yemen (1974–1977), sponsored a quad summit at the level of presidents of the countries bordering the Red Sea, held on Sunday, March 20, 1977, in the city of Taiz. The summit discussed the issue of Red Sea security with the participation of Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri, President of Somalia Mohammed Siad Barre, and President of South Yemen Salem Ruba’e Ali, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt were absent from the summit. One of the most prominent outcomes of that summit was the formation of a security and development system for the Red Sea region, a project that was assassinated along with Al-Hamdi on the evening of October 11, 1977, and buried with his body. After that, Yemen was mortgaged to a weak and dependent political regime that deliberately turned its back on the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa and led Yemen to occupy the forefront of fragile and failed states, consumed by huge gaps in visions, structures, and policies, whose regime was characterized by its inability and inertia in performing the minimum of its sovereign tasks and responsibilities, the most dangerous of which are those tasks related to the security of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, which opened the door wide for many regional and international actors to fill those gaps, before and after the war.

Perhaps one of the headlines revealing the efforts of decades of undermining, weakening, guardianship, hegemony, and subservience is the announcement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Wednesday, December 12, 2021, 44 years after the assassination of Yemeni President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi and his initiative on the Red Sea to establish an entity of the Red Sea countries, with the aim of enhancing security, investment, and development in the countries bordering the sea. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs said at the time that seven Arab countries had agreed in the Kingdom, in the presence of Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz, to establish the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden entity, which includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Jordan, and Yemen. The Saudi Ministry indicated that the entity aims to protect global trade and international navigation traffic and to enhance security, investment, and development for the countries of the basin, and added that “the Red Sea entity is an initiative by the King Salman to achieve stability in the region.”

On Tuesday, December 11, 2022, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced, in a press statement, that “the Egyptian Naval Forces assumed command of the Combined Task Force 153, whose tasks are to combat smuggling and counter illegal activities, especially terrorist activities in all areas of the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden.” The Egyptian Armed Forces added that “this step comes within the framework of the efforts of the Egyptian Armed Forces, as a continuation of the active Egyptian participation in the Combined Maritime Force (CMF), towards improving the security environment in all areas and sea lanes, providing safe traffic for the flow of ships through international sea lanes, and confronting all forms and manifestations of organized crime that negatively affect the movement of global trade and the interests of partner countries.”

The irony is that the statement of the Egyptian Armed Forces came only three days after the Yemeni government and the Emirati government announced the signing of the “Agreement on Military and Security Cooperation and Combating Terrorism" on December 8, 2022. However, the contents and details of this agreement were not disclosed, except for a brief official statement indicating that the agreement aims to maintain security, peace, and stability in the Republic of Yemen, in addition to security and military cooperation in combating terrorism, which opened the door to many speculations and conjectures regarding the nature of that security and military cooperation and its connection to the security of the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea.

The UAE Minister of Justice and the Yemeni Minister of Defense discuss cooperation and sign an agreement on defense and counterterrorism cooperation

Prior to the statement of the Egyptian Armed Forces, the Yemeni-Emirati cooperation agreement, and the announcement of the Red Sea entity from Riyadh, the Commander of the Central Command of the US Naval Forces in the Middle East, Jim Malloy, had announced from the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Manama on Thursday, November 7, 2019, the launch of a US-led naval military coalition to protect navigation in the Gulf region. The naval area of operation (Sentennial) includes the international waters from the Arabian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman down through the Gulf of Aden, then through the Bab al-Mandab Strait into the Red Sea. Malloy said that the goal is to work together to come up with a joint international naval response to attacks against ships. He also said, “Our goal is purely defensive, and the operational structure is based on the principle of dealing with threats, not for the sake of threats.” He added, “There is no offensive plan for our efforts, except for the commitment to defend each other if we are exposed to attacks.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had made explicit threats during a military parade for Israeli naval officers in Haifa on Wednesday, August 2, 2018, in which he threatened Iran “with a military confrontation with an international coalition, which would include all the military branches of Israel, if Iran tried to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait through its allies."

Bab al-Mandab in Relation to Saudi Vision 2030

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is leading a massive transformation in Saudi Arabia, with numerous geopolitical, social, economic, security, and military dimensions. One of the main headlines of this transformation is the Kingdom's Vision 2030 and its development operations, of which the western coast of the Kingdom, on the shores and waters of the Red Sea, occupies a significant share. As promising as the kingdom's opportunities are, there are many risks and challenges lurking in and awaiting it, if we exclude the fierce Emirati competition, which sees Saudi ambitions as an existential threat to its interests. The most prominent challenges are the war in Yemen and the complicated situation there, the war in Sudan, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which are all closely related to the security of the Red Sea and the set of interests associated with it.

“Saudi Arabia has asked the United States to show restraint in responding to attacks by Yemen's Houthis against ships in the Red Sea in order to spare Yemen from further killing, devastation, and destruction and to achieve the aspirations of the Yemeni people for peace and security.‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬” The war in Yemen

Contrary to its orientation since March 2015, a new trend emerged for Saudi Arabia during 2022 and 2023 in dealing with the war file in Yemen, which revealed a real desire to end the war and work through a negotiated diplomatic path to start a Yemeni-Yemeni political process leading to a political solution to the conflict. Therefore, Oman facilitated bilateral negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Ansar Allah group "Houthis." Further, the visit of Prince Mohammed bin Salman on September 11, 2023, following his participation in the G20 Summit in the Indian capital, New Delhi, to the Omani capital, Muscat, which lasted for six days, during which he met with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, Sultan of Oman, constituted a great boost to those efforts aimed at stopping the war. In parallel, and in a path related to the war file in Yemen and other regional conflict files, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced on March 10, 2023, from the Chinese capital, Beijing, the return of relations between the two countries under Chinese sponsorship, after they had witnessed unprecedented tension since 2016. In this respect, the newly appointed Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Ali Reza Enayati, said after a meeting between the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abdullahian, and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, that “the return of relations between the two countries will have important effects on stability and the culture of dialogue in the Middle East region.”

On Thursday, December 7, 2023, Saudi media sources indicated that Saudi Arabia has asked the United States to show restraint in responding to attacks by Yemen's Houthis against ships in the Red Sea in order to spare Yemen from further killing, devastation, and destruction and to achieve the aspirations of the Yemeni people for peace and security. ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

The War in Sudan

On April 15, 2023, violent fighting broke out in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, and in a number of other Sudanese cities between the Sudanese army, supported by Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and the Rapid Support Forces, supported by the UAE on the other hand, after weeks of escalating tension over a plan aimed at handing over power to civilians. However, the fighting extended in September to the port of Port Sudan, the vital trade route. Consequently, the war in Sudan has posed a threat to Saudi security objectives in the Red Sea. Since the outbreak of fighting in 2023, Riyadh has engaged in mediation efforts jointly with the United States. In this concern, it is important to recall what was published by the Wall Street Journal about Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's talk to a team of his aides about being stabbed in the back by the UAE, an ally of Saudi Arabia, at least ostensibly, in the context of his talk about the Emirati role in the Sudan war, which supports the Rapid Support Forces against the Sudanese army, which is supported by Saudi Arabia.

For all this, stability in the Red Sea region is crucial to a large number of Saudi “Vision 2030” projects, including the new urban area “NEOM” northwest of the Tabuk region, which includes a floating port city on the Red Sea coast and luxury island destinations, in addition to the tourism development project called “Red Sea International," and the Yanbu terminal, which is of great importance in terms of the traditional oil economy in Saudi Arabia as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz. Further, in 2018, the Kingdom increased its export capacity from its western coast.

Accordingly, the issue of the security of the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, down to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, intersects the interests of Saudi Arabia and its Vision 2030 with the interests of Yemen, represented by the existence of a stable Yemeni state, against perceptions of fragmentation and weakening, and against the empowerment of non-national functional armed formations, contrary to the UAE’s perspective, interests, and influence.

“The UAE acquires vital and strategic Yemeni ports and regions, in addition to controlling many ports in the Horn of Africa. Through the Dubai Ports Company, it invests and manages a vast network of ports and marine facilities, estimated according to its website at 78 ports and marine terminals distributed in about 40 countries along the six continents of the world.” UAE activity in Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden

For security, military, economic, political, and demographic purposes, the UAE has engaged, since the announcement of coalition operations in Yemen on March 26, 2015, in acquiring vital areas within the framework of its focus on ports overlooking the waterways, which, if operated, could negatively affect Jebel Ali Port and Dubai Ports. Therefore, it sought to seize control of those areas, starting by establishing military bases there or empowering armed formations loyal to it. Its influence now includes the ports of Al-Mukalla, Shabwa, Aden, Al-Makha, Mayun Island, the Greater and Lesser Hanish Islands, Bab al-Mandab, and Socotra Island in the Indian Ocean, while its eyes are still open to Al-Mahra, eastern Yemen, and to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.

The UAE virtually controls vital and strategic Yemeni ports and regions, in addition to controlling many ports in the Horn of Africa, including the ports of Djibouti, Bosaso (Puntland/Somalia), Berbera (Somaliland/Somalia), Assab, and Massawa (Eritrea). Through the Dubai Ports Company, it invests and manages a wide network of ports and marine facilities, estimated according to its website at 78 ports and marine terminals distributed in about 40 countries along the six continents of the world.

Prior to the war in Yemen, the Yemeni government announced, on August 25, 2012, the cancellation of an agreement in which the Dubai Ports Company was granted the operation of the port of Aden, starting in 2008, because of accusing the Dubai company of committing breaches, through which it intended to disrupt work at the port for the benefit of other ports it manages. Similarly, the government of Djibouti accused Dubai Ports in 2014 of offering bribes to the head of the Port and Free Zone Authority in Djibouti at the time, Abdelrahman Boureh, to ensure winning the concession contract for managing the Doraleh Oil Terminal and Port, which prompted President Ismail Omar Guelleh to unilaterally terminate the contract. However, in March 2016, the London Court of International Arbitration rejected the Djibouti government’s accusations against Dubai Ports and obligated it to pay the costs of the lawsuit.

“There is a map of a "divided Taiz," according to three no's guidelines: No to Houthi control over all of Taiz, or part of it, including Bab al-Mandab. No to the Islah Party's (the brotherhood) control over all of Taiz or part of it, including Bab al-Mandab. No to Salafist and extremist Sunni organizations’ control over parts of Taiz, including Bab al-Mandab, which are closely related to scenarios of a potential regional or international conflict.”

The ‘Divided’ Taiz and the Conflict Over its Geography

To understand the complex situation of the devastating conflict in Taiz, one of the main headlines of the war in Yemen, it is important to review a number of stations, events, and facts related to that conflict aims to control the mainland of Taiz, which is located in the middle of the Yemeni map, namely the mainland of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. In fact, it is a complex and long conflict that has not received the necessary amount of research, study, analysis, and discussion, despite the great central importance that Taiz, with its land, sea, and population mass, represents in the general Yemeni scene, in peace and war.

Since the early months of the conflict, several parties have sought to take full control of Taiz governorate with its natural geographical and administrative borders, starting with the Ansar Allah group (Houthis), passing through the formations of the Islah Party, and ending with the formations of the Salafists led by the UAE-backed Abu al-Abbas. Meanwhile, the forces of the Houthi group and Saleh were about to take control of the entire city of Taiz and its countryside, in conjunction with their reaching Aden during the month of March 2015, peaceful protest demonstrations took place against the group's control over Taiz and Aden governorates on Tuesday, March 24, 2015. On that day, the militants of the Ansar Allah group "Houthis" and soldiers from the Special Security Forces attacked two separate peaceful demonstrations, opening fire on a peaceful gathering in Al-Qasr Tour, northeast of the city of Taiz.

Likewise, in a separate attack, they opened fire on another peaceful demonstration in the city of Al-Turbah, southwest of Taiz. Consequently, since that bloody day, Taiz has entered into a devastating conflict, during which thousands of civilians have been killed and thousands of others wounded.

While the conflict in Taiz focused on controlling the city of Taiz, many armed groups were formed in the face of the Houthi group and Saleh's forces, most notably those loyal to the Islah Party, led by Hamoud Al-Mikhlafi, while regular soldiers belonged to the 35th Brigade, led by Brigadier General Adnan Al-Hammadi, and Salafi groups were formed under the command of Abu Al-Abbas. In 2015, 2016, and 2017, Taiz witnessed the most violent confrontations. Dozens of deadly attacks targeted civilians in the city of Taiz. The Houthi group, together with Saleh's forces, imposed a suffocating siege on the city. However, the armed formations confronting the Houthi group and Saleh's forces managed to break it from the western side after controlling most of the area of the city of Taiz, all the way to Al-Hujariya in the west, while the Houthi group fought hard to retain control over parts of the east, north, and south of Taiz city.

Subsequently, in parallel with the war on the city of Taiz, the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced, on July 14, 2015, launching a naval, air, and land military operation to liberate the city of Aden from the control of the forces of the Ansar Allah group “Houthis” and their ally at the time, former President Saleh. This was followed by a another military operation to liberate the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Dhubab district on October 1, 2015, when those areas were taken from the control of the Houthis and became under the control of Yemeni formations loyal to the Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition. One of the most notable events during that period was the frequency of attacks on ships and battleships while crossing the waters of the Red Sea. On October 10, 2016, the US Department of Defense announced that the destroyer USS Mason was exposed to a missile attack, in which it accused the Houthis, who denied knowledge of the attack, one week after it was announced that an Emirati ship was attacked by the Houthis. On January 23, 2017, the Yemeni army and Popular Resistance Forces, backed by the coalition, announced the complete recapture of the city of Al-Makha—the strategic port on the Red Sea, west of Taiz governorate—from the forces of the Houthi group and former President Saleh after battles described as “violent."

Furthermore, before the city of Taiz knew its path to recovery from the first round of the conflict, it sank into a new round of it, between the allies to control it, between the formations of Abu al-Abbas, backed by the UAE on the one hand, and the Islah formations on the other hand. Amid that conflict, extremist formations infiltrated into the heart of the urban city, and on April 21, 2018, it was announced that Hanna Lahoud, an employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross, was killed in Taiz at the hands of extremists. Throughout 2015, 2016, and 2017, the support for the coalition and the UAE focused in particular on strengthening and empowering the Salafist formations of Abu al-Abbas, at the expense of the Islah Party formations, led by Hammoud al-Mikhlafi, which had been threatened with a process of forced weakening and an escalating path of subjugation by the coalition's power and dominance in one of the Party's most important strongholds.

The process of weakening and limiting the formations of the Islah Party, which was underway and in full swing, did not stop except with the announcement of the US administration’s inclusion of Adel Abdo Farea “Abu Al-Abbas” on October 25, 2017, on the US terrorist lists, and subsequently on the lists of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Thus, an exceptional opportunity opened up for the Islah Party formations, which were ready to seize that opportunity and restore their absolute control and influence over the city of Taiz under the pretext of combating terrorism. Later, after regaining absolute control over the city, the Islah formations turned their backs on the Houthi forces, which are entrenched east of the city, and headed west to control the Al-Turbah and Al-Hujariyah areas, southwest of Taiz.

“The architects of the "divided" Taiz's map resorted to a number of serious security, military, economic, and political concerns of many actors there, the common factor among whom is the urgent need to ensure the neutralization of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden from any uncontrolled use.” By tracking the course of the conflict in Taiz, it is clear that there is a map of a "divided Taiz," according to the three No's guidelines: No to the Houthi’s control over all of Taiz, or part of it, including Bab al-Mandab. No to the Islah Party's (the brotherhood) control over all of Taiz or part of it, including Bab al-Mandab. No to Salafist and extremist Sunni organizations’ control over parts of Taiz, including Bab al-Mandab, which are closely related to scenarios of a potential regional or international conflict. Among its lines of contact are: the issues of the “Palestinian-Israeli conflict" and the conflict with Iran. In addition to the competition and the conflict of the great powers, the issues of “combating terrorism" and the security of the “Bab al-Mandab Strait,” the “Red Sea,” and the “Gulf of Aden.” These are the conscious objections of an orphan common denominator that combines the three (Islamic) components, represented by their position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is an issue that, due to its high sensitivity and importance, leaves no room for risk by betting on the lines and effects of the war alliances in Yemen and their polarization.

Due to the high importance of its geographical location and its large population mass, the architects of the "divided" Taiz's map resorted to a number of serious security, military, economic, and political concerns of many actors, the common factor among whom is the urgent need to ensure the neutralization of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden from any uncontrolled use in the event of any regional or international conflict. The international and regional actors did not leave it to chance, as usual. Therefore, over the ten years of conflict, no party has been allowed to unilaterally control the entire governorate of Taiz, with its natural borders and, on top of that, the vast areas and mountainous heights representing the "mainland" of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. Eventually, it was settled on dividing the governorate into three regions, under the control of different parties and formations. Consequently, this division has become a reality in Taiz, where military operations have been concentrated on its fronts to impose the limits of its regions on the ground. Meanwhile, the "friendly fire" of the UAE-Saudi coalition fighter jets ensured any violation of those precise borders by any party. Over the course of many years of war, Taiz's fronts have remained inflamed and on fire, unlike many of the 42 war fronts, which have mostly drifted into latency and dormancy since 2016, with some occasional exceptions, in no more than 5 fronts at the upper limit.

With the stability of the Houthi group’s control over part of Taiz and the Islah formations’ control over another part of it—at a time when Brigadier General Adnan al-Hammadi, the commander of the 35th Brigade, who was later killed on December 2, 2019, under mysterious and ambiguous circumstances, declared that he rejected generous offers in exchange for taking over the task of crushing the Islah formations and controlling the city of Taiz or even the southwestern part of Taiz (Al-Hujariya, Bab al-Mandab and the western coast)—the UAE was stuck in its urgent need to create a new armed formation and assign it to the task of taking over the third part of Taiz, whose orbit is concentrated in the region of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, at sea and on land, as an armed, trained, and loyal force that undertakes the task of preventing the combat formations of the three “Islamic” components from reaching Bab al-Mandab and its area and is responsible for preventing any fire or operational access to the shipping lines on the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, in all circumstances.

As part of the completion of this mission, northwest of Taiz, the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates announced on Wednesday, June 14, 2018, the launch of Operation Golden Victory to liberate the coastal city of Al-Al-Hodeidah from the control of the Houthi forces. In this operation, the coalition forces and local formations reached, in record time, the borderlands of Al-Al-Hodeidah airport and Al-Durayhimi district, located ten kilometers south of Al-Al-Hodeidah city. Then, after nearly six months of violent conflict south of Al-Al-Hodeidah city, the UN envoy announced on December 13, 2018, that the parties had signed the “Stockholm Agreement" after seven days of UN-sponsored negotiations between the parties.

“A massive propaganda campaign worked to paint an imagined mental picture of many military, developmental, and political achievements under the leadership of Tariq Saleh in a way that lacked the minimum level of information and accurate facts.”

Tariq Saleh’s mission

In mid-February 2018, the first appearance of Brigadier General Tariq Saleh was recorded in the city of Al-Makha, who had previously commanded the Special Guard and the Third Brigade of the Presidential Guard during the last years of the rule of his uncle, Saleh, who was killed on December 2, 2017, following bloody armed confrontations that ended his close alliance with the Houthis. Subsequently, Tariq Saleh announced the establishment of new armed formations under his leadership, under the name of the National Resistance/Guardians of the Republic, and with the support of the UAE, controlling the city of Al-Makha and its strategic port as a new party in the war. Later, these formations were involved, together with other military forces, in what is known as the Joint Forces, in a large-scale military operation launched on April 19, 2018, to control the Khalid bin Al-Walid camp, east of the city of Al-Makha, and control the main road between the coastal city of Al-Makha and the city of Taiz, and this later contributed to the advance towards the city of Al-Hodeidah to the north, in a military operation called “Golden Victory” in June 2018.

Within the context of the Saudi-Emirati rivalry for influence and control, coinciding with a large-scale escalation on the fronts of Marib and Shabwa, the military formations of the Guardians of the Republic (the National Resistance), led by Tariq Saleh and backed by the UAE, announced on Thursday, November 11, 2021, a unilateral and sudden withdrawal process from their advanced control sites south of the city of Al-Hodeidah, with an area estimated at 100 kilometers on the western coast. The withdrawal process had nothing to do with the Stockholm Agreement. Further, it took place without the knowledge of the United Nations or any of its offices and agencies, and also without the knowledge of the internationally recognized government or any of its designated local authorities. The process was also not coordinated with the other local armed formations, loyal to the recognized government, and the coordination was limited only within narrow limits between the Joint Forces and the Transitional Council, supported by the UAE, while the Houthis pushed military reinforcements to fill the void two days before the withdrawal and took control of all the areas withdrawn from without a fight.

Over the course of five years of enabling Brigadier General Tariq Saleh to control the city of Al-Makha and a number of adjacent areas, a massive propaganda campaign worked to paint an imagined mental picture of many military, developmental, and political achievements under the leadership of Tariq Saleh in a way that lacked the minimum level of information and accurate facts. Although Brigadier General Tariq Saleh and the armed formations he leads since April 2018 did not recognize the authority of the internationally recognized government during Hadi's presidency, he was appointed a member of the Presidential Leadership Council on April 7, 2022, which was announced from Riyadh, and turned the page of President Hadi, who had assumed the presidency on February 21, 2012, succeeding President Saleh, within the framework of the Gulf initiative and its executive mechanism.

Later on, under the cover of his new position as a member of the Presidential Leadership Council and in the wake of the escalation on the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, it was announced that Brigadier General Tariq Saleh had arrived in the Republic of Djibouti on November 29, 2023, and met in the capital, Djibouti, with the President of the Republic of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh. The meeting discussed regional and international developments and ways to counter the growing threats to international navigation across the Red Sea, which represent a threat to regional and global security and stability.

In light of the complete absence of any reference to the regular Yemeni naval forces or to any representatives of the relevant Yemeni ministries and institutions, it was announced on Thursday, November 30, 2023, the signing of a bilateral agreement between the governorates of Taiz and Djibouti, signed on the Yemeni side by the governor of Taiz, Nabil Shamsan, and on the Djibouti side by the governor of Djibouti, Saeed Daoud. According to a brief and ambiguous press release, it aims to strengthen cultural and tourism ties, trade exchanges, investment flows, the exchange of experiences in the areas of infrastructure construction, and create job opportunities for the people of the two cities within the framework of cooperation agreements.

“The Houthi forces’ operation to seize the ship Galaxy and the other attacks took place about three hundred nautical miles from the Bab al-Mandab Strait and about 50 miles west of the port of Al-Hodeidah, which is under the control of the Houthi group, an area outside the range of expectations that have been widely focused on the perimeter of the Bab al-Mandab Strait.”

Houthis' Escalating on the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab

As a response to the military operation launched by Israel on the Gaza Strip, following the attack by Palestinian factions on the Gaza envelope area on October 7, 2023, and amid Israeli, American, and Western efforts aimed at confining the conflict between Israel and Hamas to the Gaza Strip and not allowing the conflict to expand to a broader regional extent, the Ansar Allah group (Houthis) issued warnings to target any Israeli ships crossing the waters of the Red Sea. Later, only days after its threats, the group's military spokesman, Yahya Saree, announced on November 19, 2023, the detention of an Israeli commercial ship in the Red Sea and forced it to head to the port of Saleef in Al-Hodeidah as a response to the military operation that targeted the Gaza Strip and its siege.

In this regard, the US Maritime Administration said on its website that the Galaxy Leader ship was hijacked about 50 miles west of the Houthi-controlled port of Al-Hodeidah, adding that “ships should exercise caution when crossing this area." For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considered the hijacking an "Iranian attack on an international ship," accusing the Houthis of carrying out the operation based on "Iranian instructions." For its part, Iran rejected Israeli accusations of involvement in the operation, and Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani said that "these accusations are empty and result from the complex circumstances faced by the Zionist entity.

In a statement issued on Tuesday, November 28, 2023, the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations (G7) called on the Houthi group to immediately stop threats targeting international shipping lanes and commercial ships and to release the M/V Galaxy Leader and its crew.

Commenting on the statement of the foreign ministers of the Group of Seven Industrialized Countries, Mohammed Abdulsalam, the chief negotiator for the Ansar Allah group “Houthis”, said on Wednesday, November 29, 2023, that the operations targeting ships are limited to Israeli ships. He added that the fate of the Israeli ship is linked to the choices of the Palestinian factions, and that Israel’s crimes against the Palestinians represent a threat to regional and international security and peace, and that confronting Israel and its aggressive activities against the Palestinian people and against the region is necessary to ensure the security and peace of the region and the world.

On December 1, 2023, members of the UN Security Council condemned the attacks by the Houthis against a commercial ship in the Red Sea and called for the immediate release of the MV Galaxy Leader and its crew. The members of the Council stressed the importance of navigational rights and freedoms for all ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, in accordance with international law. Likewise, the European Union also condemned the attacks launched by the Houthis with missiles and drones on commercial ships in the Red Sea.

On December 3, 2023, the Red Sea witnessed a new escalation as the US Department of Defense announced that a US warship and several commercial ships were attacked on Sunday in the Red Sea. Further, Reuters also quoted from the Britain's maritime agency as reporting drone activity and a possible explosion in the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea. In the same context, the British maritime security company Ambry said a container ship was exposed to damage by a drone attack about 63 miles northwest of the port of Al-Hodeidah in northern Yemen. The Houthi group's military spokesman later announced that the group had claimed responsibility for targeting two "Israeli" ships in Bab al-Mandab. In return, Israel also announced sending naval vessels and a submarine to the Red Sea after targeting ships by the Houthi group.

Since the outbreak of the war between Israel and Hamas on October 7, the Houthis have launched a series of missile and drone attacks from Yemen towards southern Israel in solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. According to a statement attributed to Gideon Gulbar, director of the port of Eilat, that “the Houthi threats have affected all ships, whether those passing to the Mediterranean Sea or to the port of Eilat.”

While regional and international actors sought to secure the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the vast land areas adjacent to it, parallel to the international shipping lanes on the Red Sea, to prevent any possible hostile fire or operational access, in all circumstances, the Houthi forces’ operation to seize the ship Galaxy and the other attacks took place about three hundred nautical miles from the Bab al-Mandab Strait and about 50 miles west of the port of Al-Hodeidah, which is under the control of the Houthi group, an area outside the range of expectations that have been widely focused on the perimeter of the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Conclusions

The accumulation of the failures of all the tricks that relied on the effects of undermining, weakening, dismantling, subjugation, and dependency; on fueling local conflicts; on the creation of functional non-national armed formations and empowering them in strategic geographic areas carved out on the borders of fragmentation, and managing the conflicts and balances between those formations as an imaginary way to ensure the security of international navigation and to guard the smooth movement of interests across the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf of Aden, requires the implementation of a different approach that sees the optimal way to ensure the security and safety of international navigation and the smooth movement of interests on the waters of the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf of Aden in the presence of a modern Yemeni state that engages with the world with a reasonable and fair amount of legitimate interests and benefits from its strategic location. This includes opportunities to promote maritime trade through the development of ports and facilitating shipping movement, which enhances maritime trade and contributes to improving the national economy; providing maritime safety services for ships crossing the Bab al-Mandab Strait; developing coastal areas; and building infrastructure and facilities to support economic growth in cooperation with other countries bordering the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden to enhance regional stability.