Yemenis Abroad

Since the onset of the conflict, Yemen has experienced waves of forced, voluntary, and discretionary displacement across two primary levels: internal displacement, predominantly among lower and middle classes within Yemen, and external migration, primarily among the upper classes. The latter group has sought refuge in various regional capitals and cities, such as Cairo, Amman, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Muscat, Beirut, Istanbul, Malaysia, and countries in the Horn of Africa. This movement has been influenced by various political factors driving the developments and interactions of the conflict. For thousands of Yemenis from these upper classes, many European capitals and cities, as well as cities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Canada, have become their final destinations.

Over a decade of conflict in Yemen, these waves of displacement, asylum-seeking, and migration have been driven by several key factors: political and military polarization, the need for shelter and sustenance, political and military sponsorship, participation in war propaganda and its platforms, involvement in foreign relations guided by local and regional actors, and the urgent need to escape targeted persecution and danger. Additional factors include employment opportunities within regional offices of institutions, agencies, and missions; educational and training opportunities; diplomatic work; rising numbers of expatriates; and the pursuit of asylum, migration, and resettlement as a means to a better life. These migrations have often been politically motivated or directed by various local and regional groups, leading to the displacement of investments, capital, and professional expertise, as well as the emigration of civil society organizations and their activities.

Despite the extensive demands of migration, resettlement, and displacement, many Yemenis abroad have continued to engage actively in Yemeni affairs. This includes working diligently in support of the warring factions they are aligned with, promoting hate speech, engaging in defamation campaigns, and spreading false narratives against any voices that oppose their aligned factions. They also perpetuate false depictions of paradise in the areas controlled by their affiliated factions and portray hellish conditions in areas controlled by opposing factions, all while continuing to incite further conflict and push for total and decisive victory. Conversely, a number of other expatriates have focused on building new lives while quietly observing the developments in Yemen.

With the exception of a small number of Yemeni expatriates, refugees, and displaced persons who have pursued constructive and positive efforts to address the catastrophic effects that continue to undermine all means of life in their homeland, most Yemenis abroad have engaged in the orbit of war narratives, directives, and objectives. This has occurred under the comprehensive sponsorship provided by the pathways of migration, asylum, and displacement in their new countries of residence. This refutes any notion of necessity or compulsion to engage in such war-related activities. The irony lies in the fact that war brokers often retain significant illicit profits in black market havens provided by third countries, allowing them to evade legal obligations regarding financial transparency and accountability, as required by oversight and auditing authorities under the rule of law, and ensuring equal rights, duties, and obligations for all citizens in their host countries.

As Sana’a, Al-Hodeidah, Aden, Marib, Taiz, Hadhramaut, Shabwah, and Al-Mokha became the primary destinations for waves of internal displacement, Saudi and Emirati cities welcomed the largest share of external refugees. These were followed by Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Turkey, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Kuwait. In these countries, a massive number of unemployed Yemenis are depleting substantial official and unofficial budgets to secure housing, sustenance, and other living expenses, despite the absence of any real political or security justification for this abnormal situation. Yemen is currently under the control of several factions.

Although the multiplicity of ruling parties and authorities across Yemen's different regions has many negative consequences, the only positive aspect of this abnormal situation is the variety of options available to Yemenis. They can choose to live, either by force or voluntarily, away from any area under the control of a specific faction. They can move to areas controlled by other factions, where the conditions may differ significantly. These internal areas in Yemen are more deserving of the substantial foreign currency expenditures circulating among the tens of thousands of Yemenis who have prolonged their stay in neighboring countries, regardless of the sources or legitimacy of these funds.

In addition to the numerous negative and catastrophic political, economic, social, and demographic impacts resulting from the abnormal situation of large Yemeni communities in various capitals and cities outside Yemen, these populations have become a haven for many illegal activities. They have fostered a culture of idleness, dependency, and extortion. Furthermore, the financial liquidity generated by differences in foreign currency exchange rates has provided a safe space for exploiting the deteriorating economic, living, and humanitarian conditions within Yemen. This exploitation has manifested in organized efforts to lure young girls into the hidden traps and labyrinths of human trafficking and prostitution, all outside the reach of legal and societal protection mechanisms.

Amid the escalating social, political, economic, and security challenges both within and beyond Yemen due to the protracted conflict, a new phenomenon has surfaced: the "migrant civil society." This term encompasses a wide network of activists, researchers, journalists, politicians, and influencers who, whether by choice or necessity, have found themselves in various forms of migration, asylum, expatriation, or displacement across numerous capitals and cities outside Yemen. These individuals have opted to perpetuate and institutionalize their presence in these foreign lands—a presence that was originally meant to be temporary, limited, and exceptional. Instead of returning to their homeland, they have established themselves as permanent fixtures abroad, transforming what was intended as a provisional situation into a lasting one. This shift stands in stark contrast to the fundamental importance of being on the ground in Yemen, where they could have served as vital resources for operations, programs, interventions, and expenditures within the country.

Over the years, the gaps between civil society in Yemen and the "migrant civil society" have widened significantly. These gaps encompass differences in visions, goals, priorities, assessments, activities, operations, programs, interventions, and execution plans. There is also a growing divergence in how these groups interpret and evaluate the developments in Yemen, identify and represent stakeholders, and set priorities, especially as competition intensifies over the limited resources allocated to civil society activities. The migrant civil society has gone to great lengths to justify its presence and programs outside Yemen by creating a narrative that undermines the reputation of the civil society still operating within Yemen. This narrative asserts the impossibility of effective on-the-ground presence and operations within Yemen and questions the credibility and impact of the ongoing efforts there. As a result, a significant portion of humanitarian response funds has been diverted to support expensive programs and activities addressing the situation in Yemen but implemented entirely outside the country.

A vast network of Yemeni actors abroad has capitalized on their significant mobility within the international donor and support community, exploiting opportunities that are otherwise restricted by the warring parties within Yemen. These parties have imposed severe limitations on freedom of movement, making travel to and from Yemen increasingly difficult and complex, and complicating the procedures and requirements for accessing most capitals and cities worldwide. This network has also leveraged the real restrictions imposed by the warring factions on civil society activities inside Yemen to reinforce the perception of a completely closed and opaque environment for civil presence and activity. They consistently cast doubt on the integrity, institutional capacity, effectiveness, independence, and outcomes of civil society organizations operating within Yemen, thereby promoting an image of an entirely obstructed and darkened space for civil engagement in the country.

Consequently, a situation of conflicting interests has gradually emerged between civil, humanitarian, human rights, and research institutions within Yemen and a broad sector of Yemeni actors in these same fields abroad. This conflict has extended to a wider scope, encompassing large segments of Yemeni society both inside and outside the country. It is a real and ongoing issue that cannot be ignored and must be considered across all pathways and levels of engagement with the situation in Yemen. This includes the need to strengthen independent evaluation and assessment mechanisms for everything presented as certainties, facts, or truths about the situation in Yemen—whether they are guidelines, conclusions, results, objectives, demands, recommendations, mechanisms, solutions, definitions, classifications, activities, programs, or operations. Such independent scrutiny is essential to ensuring the effectiveness, feasibility, accuracy, and informed nature of any interventions and responses funded by taxpayer and donor resources.

Therefore, it is crucial that one of the strategic guidelines for all forms of regional and international support aimed at making a positive impact in Yemen be conditioned on the requirement for such support to be realized within Yemen itself. This includes the establishment, presence, planning, implementation, operation, and employment of resources within the country. There is a need to reduce the scope of the "migrant civil society" and encourage its members to end their prolonged state of exile, returning to Yemen to contribute to recovery efforts alongside the diverse segments of Yemeni society still residing in the country. This should be part of a comprehensive strategy to narrow the vast scope where enormous resources are wasted on superficial and propagandistic activities under the guise of addressing the situation in Yemen. These activities, carried out by a large contingent of commentators, theorists, experts, and spokespersons, lack tangible impact, even as Yemen's need for on-the-ground workers in various regions grows ever more urgent.

Addressing the unnatural and unjustifiable situation of tens of thousands of Yemenis, including a large network of entities and personnel such as activists, researchers, journalists, media professionals, politicians, academics, and influencers, who have remained abroad for extended periods, is not intended to infringe upon the fundamental rights of Yemenis who have chosen, of their own free will, to migrate or seek asylum in new countries to ensure a better life for themselves and their families. Those who have committed to these new circumstances must not be targeted. However, urgent reforms are needed to relieve the immense pressure on Yemen's worsening conditions, which are exacerbated by the costs of maintaining a large contingent of Yemenis, including individuals, entities, programs, and activities, in an abnormal, unfamiliar, unexplained, and unjustifiable state of indefinite, extended stay in neighboring capitals and countries, under the pretext of "addressing the situation in Yemen." Any efforts to perpetuate and normalize this situation, ensuring its continuation, would only contribute to systematic and active participation in corruption and its perpetuation.