Leaps in the Dark

Escalation and Its Inevitable Consequences

Monday, 15 July 2024

Following the truce signed by Yemeni parties under UN auspices on April 2, 2022, which was reinforced by agreements to de-escalate and cease military operations for nearly two years, Hans Grundberg, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Yemen, announced on December 25, 2023, that the Yemeni conflict parties had reached an agreement. This agreement includes a comprehensive ceasefire, measures to improve living conditions, payment of public sector salaries, resumption of oil exports, opening of roads in Taiz and other parts of Yemen, easing restrictions on Sana’a Airport and Hudaydah Port, and a series of trust-building measures. These steps aim to resume an inclusive political process under UN auspices to establish lasting peace in Yemen.

Despite significant criticisms regarding the slow pace of peace efforts, numerous violations, and challenges that threatened to undermine the fragile non-war state, many urgent demands remained unmet. Nonetheless, the progress made in the peace process yielded significant benefits for millions of Yemenis, which should have been preserved and built upon to achieve further gains for all Yemenis and ultimately establish a comprehensive, just, and sustainable peace.

Weeks following the October 7 attack by Palestinian factions on Israeli settlements in the Gaza envelope area, on the north of the Palestinian Strip under siege for more than 15 years, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group announced on November 19, 2023, that they had seized an Israeli commercial ship in the Red Sea, directing it to the port of Salif in Hudayda. This marked the beginning of operations targeting ships and maritime tankers traveling to and from Israel through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, in response to the horrific Israeli military operations against Gaza and the international community's failure to protect Palestinians and stop Israeli crimes. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) group forces claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks on Israeli ships and tankers in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, Israeli, American, and Western efforts aimed to contain the conflict within the boundaries of the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, preventing a broader regional escalation to protect Israel during its military operations and atrocities against Palestinians.

In response to a series of significant Houthi attacks affecting maritime traffic to and from Israel, American and British forces launched a military operation named "Guardian of Prosperity" on the evening of Thursday, January 11, 2024. They conducted dozens of attacks targeting Houthi-controlled areas in Sanaa, Hudaydah, Al-Bayda, Taiz, and Raymah, alongside a series of measures aimed at pressuring the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group to cease their attacks on tankers heading to or from Israel. American officials repeatedly stated that these operations would stop once the Houthis halted their attacks, which the Houthis conditioned on ending the Israeli war in Gaza.

Simultaneously, with the American-British military operations in Yemen and the re-listing of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group as a terrorist organization by the US, imposing sanctions and other diplomatic pressures, the Biden administration, through its ambassador to Yemen, revealed its opposition to the peace process framework previously announced by the UN envoy. This contrasted with the new Saudi approach to the situation in Yemen, which leaned towards politics, negotiations, and de-escalation. In contrast, the Biden administration risked sacrificing the significant progress made in peace efforts since the truce announcement in April 2022 and subsequent de-escalation agreements and cessation of direct military operations, culminating in the UN envoy's December 2023 announcement. The Biden administration's intensifying efforts is attempting to push the situation in Yemen towards a new, ill-considered round of escalation, lacking even the minimum requirements of any medium- or long-term strategic perspective.

From their perspective, the anti-Houthi Yemeni parties, integrated within the Presidential Leadership Council and the internationally recognized government, view the tactical shift in U.S. policy towards Yemen as an unprecedented opportunity to maximize their gains. Their primary goal is to leverage this change to adjust the imbalanced power dynamics on the ground—militarily, security-wise, and politically—under the pretext of countering Houthi escalation in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait. These anti-Houthi Yemeni parties have not only called for increased support to bolster their defensive and offensive capabilities and enhance their financial and economic resources, but they have also proactively made generous offers—both individually and collectively— to be enabled to counter the threat posed by Houthi attacks on international shipping and to undermine the Houthi group, whose influence has been growing militarily, politically, financially, and economically, not only within Yemen but also regionally. This regional influence has been magnified through their involvement in Gaza, highlighting the central issue of the Palestinian cause and its conflict with Israeli occupation, a cause that resonates deeply with the majority of the region’s populations, especially in light of the horrific Israeli violations committed during the latest round of Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Regardless of the debate over the nature, impact, and scale of the Houthi attacks, and setting aside the ethical, legal, and principled motivations behind them, as well as the group's position, eligibility, and track record in the national context, these attacks have enabled the Houthis to achieve unprecedented gains both domestically and internationally. This has come at the expense of significant losses for the international community and the official Arab system, which appeared complicit and powerless against the brutal war, contrasted by Iran and the "resistance axis" groups allied with it, who have engaged with the Palestinian cause on multiple levels. These engagements included solidarity attacks against Israeli and American targets, nearly sparking a wide-scale regional war—a dimension that cannot be underestimated considering its broad implications on the ongoing developments and interactions in the region and the world since October 7.

The current intense interactions in the Yemeni scene cannot be separated from this complex international and regional context and its many interconnections, including a series of decisions issued by the Central Bank Governor in Aden, Ahmed Ghaleb Al-Maabaqi. These decisions aim, on the surface, to complete the transfer of financial and economic decision-making center to Aden, which would not have been possible at this critical and sensitive time without the lifting of the American veto that had been effectively freezing such moves since President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s announcement on September 18, 2016, to relocate the Central Bank of Yemen from Sana’a to Aden, declared the temporary capital of the internationally recognized government. Despite the severe ramifications of this decision, such as the banking sector's division, the national currency’s split, and the halt in salary payments for hundreds of thousands of public sector employees, the American veto ensured—through financial institutions—that communication and coordination channels remained open between the Central Banks in Sana’a and Aden until recently.

Given the significant impact of these decisions on the financial position of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group authorities, the group has escalated by unexpectedly raising the issue of detained U.S. embassy staff, a matter that had been frozen for years. This was used as a bargaining chip to strengthen their negotiating position, with senior leaders taking an unprecedented lead in this matter. They further threatened Saudi Arabia by suggesting a tit-for-tat scenario where banks in Riyadh would be targeted in response to actions against banks in Sana’a, and airports in Riyadh would be targeted in response to actions against airports in Sana’a, as a means to pressure Saudi Arabia and the international community.

Despite the potential dangers of these decisions, there is no indication yet of a strategic plan to address their full repercussions on the banking sector nationwide, the public, entities, and the peace process. Without such a plan, these decisions could represent a sudden shock that drives the fragile situation into a zero-sum escalation, further distancing Yemen from peace. However, if there is a strategic plan, these decisions could help establish new negotiation rules among Yemeni parties, preventing any single party from monopolizing the privilege of imposing unilateral conditions. This could steer Yemen back towards internal settlements based on a reasonable degree of constructive balance, a dynamic that has been missing from the national scene throughout a decade of the current conflict in Yemen.

In any case, it is crucial to highlight the key factors closely related to the imbalance in the Yemeni scene, across all its political, military, security, and economic dimensions. These factors include:

  • Fragmentation within the Presidential Leadership Council: The group of disparate factions under the internationally recognized government and the Presidential Leadership Council are marked by divergent leaderships, loyalties, and references, united only by the coalition’s will. This stands in stark contrast to the cohesive Ansar Allah (Houthi) group, which is led by a single leadership and vision and exerts control over a unified territory.
  • Deep-seated Conflicts: The internal relations among the factions within the Presidential Leadership Council are marred by profound and fundamental conflicts. Structural, operational, and theoretical flaws characterize the Council’s security, military, financial, economic, and political pathways. The Council has failed to make progress in integrating various security and military formations into a cohesive and effective institutional framework under the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
  • Inability to Ensure Basic Livelihoods: The Presidential Leadership Council has failed to secure the minimum requirements for a decent living for millions of people nominally under its control and the internationally recognized government.
  • Failure to Provide Effective Governance: The Presidential Leadership Council has not been able to offer a creative model in politics, administration, and leadership, which is crucial for gaining public acceptance and support. This acceptance is essential for legitimizing its representation of the people's interests and aspirations.
  • Escalating Saudi-UAE Rivalry: The growing conflict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over influence, conflicting interests, and differing objectives in Yemen, especially as the UAE has encroached on areas previously central to Saudi national security in southern, eastern, and western Yemen.
  • Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement: The requirements and commitments of the Saudi-Iranian de-escalation process in the region, brokered by China.
  • Negative Experiences with U.S. Foreign Policy: The Saudis, Emiratis, and Gulf states generally have had negative experiences with the unpredictable shifts in U.S. foreign policy, leading to diminished trust in the U.S. as an ally. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has refrained from joining the U.S.-British coalition against the Houthis and has instead issued tepid calls for restraint and de-escalation in Yemen.
  • High Demands for Security Agreements: Increased demands from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Gulf states for security and military agreements with the U.S. due to a crisis of trust.

These factors collectively make embarking on a new round of escalation and conflict, and the risk of undoing the progress made by peace efforts, akin to taking blind leaps into the dark with no real prospects. The persistence of many of the factors that led to the dire outcomes of previous conflicts, along with the reliance on a temporary tactical shift in the official American stance, suggests a repeat of long-standing failed strategies. These strategies, driven by tactical changes in mood and rhetoric similar to the current situation, have historically failed and often resulted in outcomes contrary to their declared and implicit promises. The enthusiastic, dogmatic certainty accompanying the current version of these strategies makes any level of escalation, given the regional and local factors, merely a continuation of uncalculated risks. Such an approach has been tested repeatedly over nearly a decade of conflict, yielding the same initial conditions and factors, and is likely to produce the same outcomes.

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The center works to enrich research on political, social, economic, and cultural issues in Yemen and the Arab region. It aims to enhance understanding of these issues and related events through in-depth research and field studies, diverse reports and publications, policy papers, peer-reviewed scientific books, and by organizing conferences, workshops, and specialized seminars. Additionally, the center offers training programs and supports the development of research capacities.